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Drugs’ Other Side-Effects
Craig J. Konnoth*
ABSTRACT: Drugs often induce unintended, adverse physiological reactions
in those that take them—what we commonly refer to as “side-effects.”
However, drugs can produce other, broader, unintended, even nonphysiological harms. For example, some argue that taking Truvada, a drug
that prevents HIV transmission, increases promiscuity and decreases condom
use. Expensive Hepatitis C treatments threaten to bankrupt state Medicaid
programs. BiDil, which purported to treat heart conditions for self-identified
African-Americans, has been criticized for reifying racial categories. Although
the Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) has broad discretion under the
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”) to regulate drugs, it generally
considers only traditional side-effects. Neither the agency, courts, nor scholars
have offered a systematic account of how to regulate collateral effects that do
not involve direct physiological harm to the drug’s recipient.
This Article more clearly defines these harms and explains why and how the
FDA should take them into account. It starts by offering three characteristics
that distinguish these harms from those the FDA traditionally considers. First,
unlike traditional harms, these harms are often the indirect rather than direct
result of drug consumption. Second, they often affect third parties rather than
the person that ingests the drug. Third, they might often raise non-health
considerations, such as economic or moral concerns.
Both ethically and legally, the FDA should take into account such indirect,
third-party, and non-health harms to some degree at least. Bioethical
considerations, administrative accountability and practice, as well as
pragmatic policy interests, all counsel considering these harms. But how
should the FDA do so? As the Article explains, the FDCA offers a variety of
choices for FDA intervention, ranging in intensity from flat approval refusals
to mandating labeling or prescription guidelines. In most cases, various
considerations suggest that more limited forms of intervention are usually
appropriate to address these harms.
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INTRODUCTION

Drugs produce side-effects—that is, unintended, incidental,
consequences of ingesting the drug.1 Benadryl causes drowsiness;2 Zoloft
causes nausea;3 Warfarin might result in internal bleeding.4 Sometimes such
side-effects are serious enough for the Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”)
to deny approval of the drug.5 And the public hears of the side-effects of some
drugs only after they are approved, marketed, and even prescribed.
Sometimes these side-effects are positive. NyQuil is frequently used as a
sleep medication because it produces drowsiness.6 Manufacturers might even
market these desirable side-effects.7 But most of the time, side-effects are
negative, causing discomfort, danger, and even death. These side-effects have
in common one important feature: they all involve physiological reactions to
the chemical effects of the drug. Government agencies have been equipped
to deal with these physiological effects—their experts can identify side-effects
through the pre-approval clinical trials and post-approval drug surveillance,
and their legal powers permit them to withhold or withdraw approval of drugs
that have dangerous effects.8

1. Many of my concerns apply to food and devices as well. However, the cultural role that
food plays renders distinguishing between main and side-effects impossible. The regulation of
devices differs slightly from that of drugs—enough that clarity counsels focusing only on drugs
for the purpose of this Article.
2. Diphenhydramine Hydrochloride-Drug Summary, PDR, https://www.pdr.net/drug-summary/
Diphenhydramine-Hydrochloride-diphenhydramine-hydrochloride-1140.941 [https://perma.cc/
H36P-FKQ4]. Benadryl is a brand name of diphenhydramine hydrochloride.
3. Sertraline Hydrochloride-Drug Summary, PDR, http://www.pdr.net/drug-summary/Zoloftsertraline-hydrochloride-474.3608 [https://perma.cc/HA6S-8FHS]. Zoloft is the brand name of
sertraline hydrochloride.
4. Charles Ornstein, Popular Blood Thinner Causing Deaths, Injuries at Nursing Homes,
PROPUBLICA (July 12, 2015, 7:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/popular-bloodthinner-causing-deaths-injuries-at-nursing-homes [https://perma.cc/3KKJ-HBUX] (“Coumadin
(or warfarin) is a medicine often prescribed to older adults for prevention of strokes, blood clots
and heart attacks. However, the dose must be closely monitored. Too much can lead to internal
bleeding.”).
5. See W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Regulating Ambiguous Risks: The Less than
Rational Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S387, S388–89 (2015).
6. Christine Skopec, The Most Dangerous Over-the-Counter Cold Medications, SHOWBIZ
CHEATSHEET (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.cheatsheet.com/health-fitness/dangerous-over-thecounter-cold-medications.html [https://perma.cc/MDR6-GHJN]; David Warren, Does Nyquil
Help You Sleep? What You Need to Know [Experts Say], WFM HEALTH, https://wealthformy
health.com/does-nyquil-help-you-sleep [https://perma.cc/J7Q9-D68X]. Though it is often
marketed as such.
7. United States Calming and Sleeping Market: New Insights, COMPANIES & MKTS. (June 9, 2015,
10:12 PM), https://advance.lexis.com/document/index?crid=23a32442-d5c1-42d0-a59a-bbfbc5eb
fb0b&pdpermalink=c043930e-1f86-45bb-94c1-e678af38d170&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true. It
is notable that off-label marketing is impermissible in FDA’s view. While labels indicate adverse
effects, indicating that those are benefits might be construed as misleading in the FDA’s view.
8. See infra Part V.

A4_KONNOTH (DO NOT DELETE)

174

11/11/2019 4:46 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:171

But drugs can produce other kinds of effects that go far beyond chemical
and physiological reactions. The birth control pill gave women autonomy that
they never had before.9 More recently, pre-exposure prophylaxis (“PrEP”) has
proven to prevent HIV transmission. This allows individuals to engage in
intercourse without the fear of contracting HIV and may reduce the stigma
that HIV positive individuals have suffered.10
Some may argue that these are, in fact, the main purpose of drugs. The
point of wellness isn’t to have a body that functions optimally. Rather, its good
lies in the other goals wellness allows us to pursue: autonomy, human
connection, and happiness. Drugs are marketed with the promise of joy and
productivity, rather than for producing health for its own sake.
But putting that issue to one side, my central point is that the
introduction of drugs onto the market can have additional non-physical
negative effects that are, most decidedly, unintended. Some argue that PrEP
has led to increased promiscuity and a decline in condom usage.11 The
introduction of high cost drugs in the Hepatitis C context has siphoned
resources away from other areas. Another drug, BiDil, which was famously
understood to target heart conditions specifically for African-Americans was
criticized for reifying racial categories.12 These non-physiological effects can
range from unintended changes in the behavior of individuals to broader
effects on third parties or society as a whole.
However, the literature has a gap, in that it fails to abstract and analyze
these problems—and the FDA’s engagement (or non-engagement) with
them—more generally. At base, my claim is, that as a systematic matter the
FDA regulates only (1) direct effects of the drug (2) on the person who takes
it (3) because of its physiological effects. The harms that are not considered
systematically are therefore (1) indirect effects, such as risk compensation
behavior, or (2) effects on third parties or society, that is, those who have not
taken the drug, or (3) effects that are non-physiological in nature, such as
racial effects.13 This Article concedes that the FDA should continue to focus
9. For the classic 1971 grassroots account, see JUDY NORSIGIAN, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES
91 (2011) (“Our ability to prevent or delay pregnancy is fundamental to our ability to choose
how we live our lives.”).
10. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINE ON WHEN TO START ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY AND
ON PRE-EXPOSURE PROPHYLAXIS FOR HIV 17, 29, 35 (Sept. 2015), https://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/handle/10665/186275/9789241509565_eng.pdf;jsessionid=B2F46184E8EC35B7B
512068B828D6BAE?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/S99L-FQ4K]; Dawn K. Smith et al., Attitudes
and Program Preferences of African-American Urban Young Adults About Pre-exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP),
24 AIDS EDUC. & PREVENTION 408, 418–19 (2012).
11. Travis Gasper, A Religious Right to Discriminate: Hobby Lobby and “Religious Freedom” as a
Threat to the LGBT Community, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 395, 413 (2015).
12. Michael Laufert, Race and Population-Based Medicine: Drug Development and Distributive
Justice, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 859, 873, 876 (2008).
13. Though OIRA tracks the overall cost of FDA regulations, including drug approvals,
neither OIRA nor the FDA consider the cost of the drugs being approved as a factor in costbenefit analysis in the approval process. For an example of OIRA’s consideration of cost of new
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primarily on direct, physiological, and first person side-effects, and might save
its most onerous regulation for those contexts. However, I also claim that the
FDA should take into account these “other” side-effects more systematically,
and engage in some consideration and possible regulation, usually less
onerous, based on them.
This is not to say that these effects are never, or even rarely, considered.
In many cases, as I describe below, the FDA will take some of these harms into
account. But the FDA does not explain why it does not consider these effects
in some contexts and not others, or with respect to some drugs or not others.
Indeed, in many cases, it appears that political pressure or one-off
congressional action might produce the FDA review in this area.
The limited FDA literature on these matters has not helped address the
FDA’s ad hoc approach(es). Some scholars, to be sure, have addressed
particular concerns that they believe that the FDA should take into account.
To take a few prominent examples: Numerous scholars have argued that the
FDA should take ethical concerns into account when approving drugs that
result in human enhancement, such as human growth hormone.14 Scholars
have recently argued that the FDA should take public health concerns into
account, especially in the opioid context.15 Yet others have argued that the
FDA should take into account the behavioral changes that PrEP and other
drugs produced.16 And—to offer a counterexample—a court criticized the
FDA for inappropriately taking into account political (some would called
them ethical) considerations in delaying the approval of oral contraceptives.17
But, while each line of scholarship raises important considerations that I
raise in this Article as appropriate, they do little to address the haphazard
approach. They leave most of the harms I discuss above unaddressed. They
also fail to systematize and taxonomize the harms, provide explanations for
when the FDA should regulate them, and to what degree. They focus, rather,
on powerfully elaborating the nature, degree, and extent of danger their
particular harm—growth hormones, risk compensation, and the like—poses,

regulations, the office provides a database of the cost of all new regulations. Information Collection
Review Data, OFFICE INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain;
jsessionid=B2E7F59DCB150A06FA30CF988269E9D8 [https://perma.cc/JP3G-B2L2].
14. See, e.g., Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and Law in FDA
Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135, 1184; see infra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
15. Patricia J. Zettler et al., Implementing a Public Health Perspective in FDA Drug Regulation, 73
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 221, 225 (2018). Zettler et al. focus on opioid regulation. However, opioid
regulation falls close enough to the core of the FDA’s traditional approach that I do not rely on
it heavily. Opioid addiction does not involve third parties, nor does it involve non-health effects. It
might arguably involve indirect effects (to the extent that addiction is not a “direct” effect of usage)
but that, too, is unclear. The opioid crisis therefore does not figure prominently in my analysis.
16. These battles most recently cover the approval of HIV prophylactic medication, which I
examine in detail. See infra Section III.A.
17. This involved a series of decisions under both the Bush and Obama administrations. I
discuss those decisions in greater detail in Section V.B.
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to argue that the FDA take that particular harm into account. They also
sometimes examine the precise statutory and regulatory provisions, such as
public health provisions, that allow their particular harm to be incorporated
within FDA analysis.
This Article fills this gap from both the bioethical and legal perspective.
It taxonomizes the harms into broader categories, provides a theoretical
analysis for FDA consideration of the harms in each category. Such an
approach means that this Article incorporates a broader range of concerns
and harms, most of which the legal literature has not examined. I explain that
ethical and legal considerations taken together counsel the consideration of
“other side-effects.” At the same time, it argues that its involvement should be
calibrated depending on the harm in question. I explain how the broader
statutory and regulatory logic permits, even mandates, such calibration.
Part II provides an overview of the FDA oversight process and explains
why the problem I am trying to address differs from that which occupies
traditional FDA scholarship. Next, Part III provides examples of each of these
harms with minimal definition. It also shows that in some cases, the FDA does
regulate these other party effects in certain ways, but also that there is little
explanation for the method and kind of regulation the FDA has adopted in
those areas. It is unclear whether the FDA should be doing more than it is
doing, or less, whether it is addressing the right kinds of harms, without
further examination.
The subsequent parts go about systematizing these other side-effects,
arguing for regulation in some cases, and in others, justifying the nature of
the regulation the FDA has engaged in so far. Part IV elaborates on the
conceptual categories I draw—indirect, third-party, and non-health effects
—and considers their ethical ramifications individually. Because ethical
considerations undergird legal policy in both research and clinical practice, I
also examine whether they permit consideration of other side-effects. I
conclude that they do so, and indeed, in some cases, may mandate, such
consideration.
Part V turns to legal, administrative, and policy considerations. Relying
on administrative law scholarship in other areas, Part V argues that the
essential logic of cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) which should undergird much
(albeit maybe not all) of the FDA’s analysis would require the FDA to take
into account ancillary indirect, or third-party, or non-health effects
(collectively, “other effects”). Further, values promoting information
collection for decisionmaking, transparency and democratic accountability
also require an explicit accounting of such considerations. Addressing
objections, I note that such an approach would likely save time and money in
the long run, is both analytically and practically feasible, and presents no
constitutional difficulties.
Part VI argues that because the harms themselves exist on a spectrum,
FDA action should be calibrated on a spectrum as well. Administrative law
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scholarship has, for decades now, offered the vision of a so-called
“enforcement pyramid,” where administrative actions range from lenient to
more stringent.18 FDA action can similarly range from severe to mild, affecting
manufacturers, providers, patients, and others. Scholars contemplate that the
pyramid is useful from a game theory perspective; administrators can
efficiently escalate penalties depending on the responsiveness of the
regulated firm.19
However, such regulatory calibration can also track agency expertise and
legitimacy. As in other areas of law, including constitutional law, common
sense intuitions and existing statutory structure suggest that the action’s
severity should range based on the certainty of the harm and the importance
of the regulation’s purpose. I argue that indirect harms, third-party effects,
and non-health effects are less certain and less within the FDA’s area of
expertise and legitimacy than other harms. But rather than ignore those
harms altogether, the FDA should, consistent with the statutory logic,
generally exert some limited intervention to prevent those effects. The limited
steps the FDA has adopted conforms to this statutory logic but should be
further expanded.
A final caveat. The FDA regulates a range of products. This Article
addresses only drugs. First, FDA regulation of drugs and devices have
similarities. Yet, the relative novelty of device regulation by the FDA suggests
a far more complex ontological and epistemological analysis than does that
of drugs.20 But much of what I say regarding FDA regulation of drugs applies
to devices. Second, the FDA also regulates food, cosmetics, and dietary
supplements among other items. But these items play a far more complex
cultural role than do drugs, as a general matter. FDA’s regulation of food is
less pervasive; it refrains, as it should, from intervening in the mostly nontechnical processes that construct the meaning of those items in our lives.
Finally, animal drugs and tobacco, also FDA regulated items are far more
limited in scope and interest. Drugs, however, are a different story. The FDA
is deeply involved in producing the roles that drugs play, albeit in
conversation with other social discourses.
In many cases these ‘other’ side-effects can affect the drug approval
process sub silentio. In some cases, social value debates around drugs may affect
conversations about health delivery mechanisms unrelated to drug approval
itself. Creating a forum to raise these values as part of the approval process

18. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992) (establishing the theory which has since been relied on
heavily in administrative law scholarship).
19. See id.
20. This is not to deny the relative novelty of many drug technologies. DIY gene hacking, stem
cell therapies, CRISPR, mtDNA transfer. See, e.g., Payam A. Gammage et al., Mitochondrial Genome
Engineering: The Revolution May Not Be CRISPR-Ized, 34 TRENDS IN GENETICS 101, 106–08 (2018).
THE
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might allow regulators and the public to openly engage with and understand
these issues earlier on in the process.
Examining the ripple effects of drugs beyond the physiological realm
demonstrates how health itself is discursively constructed. Accounting for
these effects demonstrates the complex way in which broader community
norms interact with and shape our understanding of health, and how health
discourses exert their own pressure in return. Embedded within these
discourses are claims about the relative value of different kinds of well-being,
about the relative importance of individual versus community health, and the
value of health more generally. The changes I prescribe will therefore invite
continuous revision and reconstruction, which requires stripping scientific
experts of exclusive jurisdiction, and bringing in society as a whole.
II.

DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM

A. THE FDA OVERSIGHT PROCESS
To understand the problem I seek to unravel, it helps first to offer an
overview of the FDA oversight process. One way to separate federal oversight
of drug safety is in two periods. First, the FDA must approve the drug, along
with labeling, and advertising. As part of this, it might also require a risk
mitigation strategy. Second, after the approval, the FDA engages in postmarket surveillance, and might require further changes, or in the most
extreme situations, withdrawal of the drug. At all times, the FDA has focused
on maintaining the physical safety of those ingesting the drug.
In 1906, the six-page Pure Food & Drug Act prohibited manufacture and
interstate transportation of “adulterated” and “misbranded” foods and
drugs;21 1912 amendments required the government to prove that the
adulterer had engaged in fraudulent behavior. In 1938, Congress passed the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).22 The “most substantial
innovation” of this Act was its approval regime—“manufacturer[s had] to
submit a new drug application” (“NDA”) which had to include studies and
labeling specimens.23 The FDA could reject an application, though if it failed
to act within 60 days, the application was considered approved.24 In 1962,
Congress
shifted the burden of proof from the FDA to the
manufacturer. Before 1962, the agency had to prove harm to keep
a drug out of the market, but the amendments required the
manufacturer to demonstrate that its drug was “safe for use under

21. Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768.
22. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i (2012)).
23. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566 (2009).
24. 21 U.S.C. § 505(c).
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the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
proposed labeling” before it could distribute the drug.25
That regime remains in place today.
The approval process focuses on ensuring that the drug is physiologically
safe and effective for ingestion. First, a manufacturer tests the drugs on
animals. If animal testing proves promising, the manufacturer would submit
an Investigational New Drug Application (“IND”), the approval of which
allows it to test the drugs on humans in a three-phase process. At Phase I, a
small group of individuals ingest the drug, to determine safe dosage ranges
and side-effects. At Phase II, a larger group takes the drug to determine
effectiveness, as well as to continue to investigate safety. At Phase III, yet a
larger group takes the drug to determine effectiveness and to continue to
develop knowledge about side-effects. Only once Phase III is complete might
the sponsor file an NDA to market the drug. Thus, all stages of the approval
process are geared towards experiments that focus on the effects of the drug
on those taking it.
While FDA approval is one of the agency’s most important activities, it
also has other powers. Three examples I will focus on in this overview are
advertising and labeling, and the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy
(“REMS”) program both of which occur pre-approval,26 and post-market
surveillance. However, each of these activities are related—for example,
labeling might be part of a risk management strategy, and post market
surveillance might lead to a change in labeling or REMS.27
The 1906 Act gave the FDA limited power over labeling.28 With approval
powers in 1962, the act required the FDA to consider approval in light of the
proposed labeling. Also, in 1962 it received power to regulate prescription
drug advertising relating to safety and efficacy, transferring this power from
the Federal Trade Commission. As it stands now, the FDA has the power to
penalize “false or misleading” advertising.29 It may also require information
regarding “side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness” to be included
in advertising or labeling. It is fair to assume that such information concerns
narrower side-effects such as physiological or chemical reactions rather than
broader side-effects. In addition to this, the FDA has the authority to
prereview television advertisements in certain narrow circumstances.
As the FDA’s power has evolved, the focus of whom, is directly protected
has also changed—but has remained ultimately, on individuals ingesting the

25. Drug Efficacy Amendment Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §§ 102(c), 104(b), 76 Stat.
780, 781, 784.
26. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1).
27. Id. § 355-1(a)(2)(A).
28. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 496–97 (1911) (noting that the agency’s power
was limited to false claims about drug ingredients).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 333(g).
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drug or those providing the drug to them for ingestation. Thus, the Senate
Report from the 1962 Amendments was primarily concerned with physicians
prescribing the drug being “regularly inundated with a great mass of
advertising and promotional material, much of which is misleading and some
actually false.”30 Similarly, the FDA justifies its oversight of such advertising
“because patients are not able to use the drug safely on their own.”31 Further,
its decisions about labeling and advertising are tied to the data that comes
from the approval process.32 The FDA’s focus has therefore been on
advertising and labeling issues as applied to the individual who ingests the
drug.
Another key tool in the FDA arsenal consists of REMS programs that the
agency might impose on drugs that it believes merit such measures. Those
programs are integrated approaches that seek to reduce the adverse effects of
the drugs. The concept is not new—many companies would voluntarily
comply with risk mitigation strategies. But the 2007 FDA Amendments Act
gave the FDA specific authority to require REMS.33 The strategy might involve
certain labeling and package inserts; however, it might also involve other
measures. Notably, the measures again, focus on the person ingesting the
drug. Three of the six (non-exhaustive) suggestions focus on the health
settings or providers who dispense the drug, and who only, presumably,
interact with the patient at the point of contact.34 The other three focus on
the wellbeing and monitoring of the patient. As described below, some REMS
might take into account broader effects, but those approaches are not
consistently enforced.
Finally, the 1962 Drug Amendments also required mandatory Adverse
Drug Experience (“ADE”) reporting by manufacturers. The statute did not

30. S. Rep. No. 87-1744, at 1 (1962), as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884, 2898.
31. Basics of Drug Ads, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/
PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/ucm072077.htm [https://perma.cc/NJX8-B7DX].
32. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355 (“[D]rug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof . . . .”). Seeking a change in labeling
requires submitting a Supplemental New Drug Application, which has labeling related change
codes. See FDA Drug Approvals List, FDA, https://web.archive.org/web/20060102003757/
http://www.fda.gov/cder/da/da.htm. See generally Katherine A. Helm, Note, Protecting Public
Health from Outside the Physician’s Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to OffLabel Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117, 152 (2007). Advertising
similarly focuses on safety issues on those ingesting the drug. Wayne L. Pines, A History and
Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 500 (1999).
33. Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 511–12 (2010).
34. The six “elements to assure safe use” (“ETASUs”) include the possibility that the
“providers . . . have particular training or experience” that those dispensing the drug “are
specially certified,” and that “the drug be dispensed to patients only in certain health care
settings, such as hospitals.” 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3)(A)–(C). Conversely, the FDA might require
the patients to provide evidence of “safe-use conditions, such as laboratory test results;” and that
the patient be “subject to certain monitoring” or “registr[ation].” Id. § 355-1(f)(3)(D)–(F).

A4_KONNOTH (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/11/2019 4:46 PM

DRUGS’ OTHER SIDE-EFFECTS

181

provide exact detail on what the experience would be, but did provide an
approach for determining how to assess physiological risk on those ingesting
the drug.35 The 2007 FDA Amendments Act enhanced post-marketing
surveillance, by, for example, allowing the FDA to mandate post-market
clinical (Phase IV) trials. This focus on clinical trials again emphasizes the
effects on individuals who take the medication.
While the statutory regime emphasizes a focus on the direct physiological
effects on individuals who take the drug, there are also a lot of other effects
that could be considered. In the next Sections, I explain what these effects
are, and make the administrative and ethical case for considering them.
Finally, I explain how the statute would accommodate taking into account
these effects.
B. CABINING THE QUESTION
The question this Article raises is fundamentally one of FDA
jurisdiction—what kind of problems can the FDA seek to solve. This should
be distinguished from another jurisdictional question—namely what kind of
items can the FDA regulate.
This latter question is the main preoccupation of much of FDA case law,
which is why I emphasize its separate orbit. The statute gives the FDA the
authority to regulate only a drug, food, cosmetic or medical devices.36 The
first FDA related cases to arrive in the federal courts for example, were
concerned whether a particular item constituted a drug.37 Courts would often
look to labels as the source of the defendant’s intent; such intent, in turn,
dispositively classified the drug.38
35. Id. § 355(k)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) (2016) (listing last minute edits).
36. Drugs are defined as substances listed in official compendia or “articles intended for use
in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease . . . and . . . articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body . . . .” 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(g)(1). A device is an item with the same property but “which does not achieve its primary
intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and
which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended
purposes.” Id. § 321(h).
37. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that that gauze bandages are a “drug” within
the definition of the Pure Food and Drugs Act. United States v. 48 Dozen Packages, More or Less,
of Guaze Bandage Labeled in Part Sterilized, 94 F.2d 641, 642 (2d Cir. 1938). In determining
whether something should be considered a “drug,” early courts would analyze the intent of the
distributor. The Fifth Circuit held that mineral water was considered a “drug” when the label
included a list of diseases that the water would cure, including diabetes. Bradley v. United States,
264 F. 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1920).
38. In U.S. v. Eleven Cartons of Drugs, etc., for example, the court held that an inhalant
shipped through interstate commerce was a drug that had been misbranded because they did not
indicate the quantity of alcohol the inhalant contained. See United States v. Eleven Cartons of
Drugs Labeled in Part ‘Vapex,’ 59 F.2d 446, 447–48 (1932). Similarly, a cure all mixture was
considered a “drug,” when its packaging included a notice “that it has and will cure Tuberculosis.”
See Seven Cases (More or Less), Each Containing Twelve Bottles of Eckman’s Alternative, Eckman
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 514 (1916). For a more recent treatment, see generally
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Although there is no doctrinal relevance, to understand the distinction
between the two jurisdictional questions, analogous problems implicated by
the jurisdiction of other entities—namely, courts—might prove illuminating.
In determining jurisdiction, courts consider inter alia, two questions.
(1) What kind of problem is before them, that is, what subject area it
implicates. Article III courts address concrete, adverse, and particular
questions related to federal law.39 Tax and bankruptcy problems will go to
other kinds of tribunals.40 (2) Next, courts consider what entity or thing is
causing the problem. Most must consider, at the very least whether there is in
rem or in personam jurisdiction, or diversity among parties.41 Others may be
limited in their reach to Indian tribes,42 juveniles,43 or military personnel.44
My claim here is that FDA case law has addressed the latter problem
—what entities (food, drugs, etc.) that is causing the problem. But FDA law
and policy have not reached what is arguably the more important question
—what kinds of problems may the agency address.
The assumption, however, appears to be that regulation—both ex ante via
the FDA, and ex post via the FDA and the tort regime—primarily should reach
(1) physiological harms (2) that can be causally directly (or at least,
physiologically) connected to the drug, which (3) affect the patient taking the
Patricia J. Zettler et al., Closing the Regulatory Gap for Synthetic Nicotine, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1933 (2018)
(describing a more recent treatment).
39. See generally Craig Konnoth & Seth Kreimer, Spelling Out Spokeo, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 47 (2016) (providing a framework for understanding Article III standing after Justice
Alito’s majority opinion in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), in which the Justice
distinguished between concrete and particularized injuries).
40. See 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 717, Westlaw (database updated August 2019) (describing
the bankruptcy jurisdiction). Other examples abound. Federal courts
are empowered to hear only those cases that (1) are within the judicial power of the
United States, as defined in the Constitution, and (2) that have been entrusted to
them by a jurisdictional grant by Congress. A federal court’s entertaining a case that
is not within its subject matter jurisdiction is no mere technical violation; it is nothing
less than an unconstitutional usurpation of state judicial power. Accordingly, there
is a presumption that a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, [and the
burden to show that it exists is on the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction].
13 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. Courts of Limited Jurisdiction § 3522 (3d ed. 2019); see also U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2.
41. For example, state long-arm statutes provide the statutory basis for jurisdiction, and Fed.
R. Civ. Proc. 4(k) describes how to establish personal jurisdiction at the federal level. International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, sets out limits on personal jurisdiction, requiring “minimum contacts” with
the forum. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Jurisdiction may also turn
on the status or classification of the person being regulated. Courts will assume jurisdiction when
they can reach a certain individual because of their status. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012)
(establishing juvenile courts).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (establishing tribal courts).
43. See 57 C.J.S. Military Justice § 20 (2012) (establishing military courts).
44. See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 680, 685–89 (2008) (finding that the habeas
corpus jurisdiction of federal courts extended to American citizens held in Iraq by a multinational
force but under the control of American military officials).
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drug. Similar criteria and distinctions appear in other jurisdictional
contexts.45 In what follows, I provide examples where at least one or more of
these three conditions do not hold and the FDA still regulates, or fails to
regulate, the problem, with no explanation as to its variable approach.
Notably, however, many of these other side-effects have not been studied
properly, which limits the documented examples I can provide.
III.

DRUG WARS

A. INDIRECT HARMS
Although the FDA generally regulates harms that affect an individual
directly, drugs might also harm individuals indirectly. These effects aren’t
caused by the chemical effect of the drug on physiology, but rather because
an intervening cause—the patient, for example—chooses to engage in a
particular behavior.
Examples abound. The first example of indirect harm occurs when the
drug is designed to assist a certain activity, which itself poses certain risks. In
the sexual context, Viagra is a useful example.46 Viagra has been linked to an
increase in sexually transmitted diseases (though causal effects have yet to be
clarified).47 Thus, some call “for greater responsibility in prescribing [erectile
dysfunction] medications.”48 But one can imagine other examples.
Another example or framing of indirect medical harm is where the drug,
intentionally or not, removes the probability or cost of perceived disincentives
that would usually deter the behavior. In choosing which activities to engage
in, individuals balance a complex range of costs and benefits. Driving a car at
40 m.p.h. for example, brings costs and benefits. Costs include financial
burdens and the risk of collision and concomitant harms. Driving a car at 70
m.p.h. may increase the benefits—you get where you need to go faster—but
increases the costs and risks. Thus, individuals might choose the former
behavior, but not the latter. However, reducing the costs of driving at 70
m.p.h.—for example, by driving when no cars are on the road, reducing the
risk of collision—will alter the relative balance of costs and benefits, making

45. For example, the questions implicated in statutory and constitutional standing together
can mostly be boiled down to considerations regarding the nature of the injury (concrete and
particularized), its causal connection to the complained of conduct, and the zone of interests’ test.
46. Some may argue that the line between direct promotion and a removal of disincentives
is a thin one. Erectile dysfunction, they might argue, is better understood as a disincentive to
intercourse. I do not in principle oppose this argument.
47. For example, it is unclear whether Viagra recipients would engage in increased intercourse
even without the drug, resulting in a high degree of STDs anyway. Frederik Joelving, Viagra-Popping
Seniors Lead the Pack for STDs, REUTERS (July 6, 2010, 8:52 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-viagra-stds-idUSTRE6652HP20100706 [https://perma.cc/CRE4-EE93].
48. Madonna Behen, Drugs like Viagra Linked to Higher Rates of STDs, HEALTHDAY (July 5,
2010), https://consumer.healthday.com/sexual-health-information-32/homosexuality-news-386/
drugs-like-viagra-linked-to-higher-rates-of-stds-640798.html [https://perma.cc/7KEJ-L5F8].
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the behavior more attractive. Scholars use the term risk compensation to
describe the phenomenon—engaging in risk “based on the expectation that
some intervention . . . has decreased . . . exposure to harm.”49
An increase in risky behavior can occur for two reasons. First, the
intervention might reduce the probability of the disincentive from occurring.
Condomless sexual behavior brings major risks such as that of HIV
transmission and pregnancy. But pills that allow a person to reduce the
probability of pregnancy or HIV transmission decrease the expected cost of
engaging in unsafe sexual behavior, thus increasing the expected amount of
the behavior.
Next, medications can reduce the overall cost of the disincentive without
necessarily affecting the probability of it occurring. There is no equivalent to
PrEP to prevent the spread of gonorrhea. But the existence of antibiotics
renders the cost of gonorrhea transmission minimal. It may not figure much
in the calculation as to whether to wear condoms.50 Pills that reduce the harm
of HIV, by rendering it a manageable disease, may similarly reduce the
perceived cost of contracting HIV.
Let us assume that, were risk compensation not to occur, that the relevant
drug decreases the expected harm to some “goal” amount. Risk compensation
increases the expected harm above that goal amount. The expected harm can
take two forms.
First, the original form of harm may continue to subsist above the goal
amount. Thus, assume PrEP or the pill decreases the risk or cost of
transmission or pregnancy by two-thirds (the number is closer to 100%),51 but
the individual engages in unprotected intercourse three times more
frequently than before. The original type of harm—HIV transmission or
pregnancy—will therefore maintain the same impact as before the drug was
released.
Second, and in addition, the behavior might introduce other forms of
harms. Condomless sex would lead to an increase in other STDs. And the costs
associated with those harms change over time. For example, with the increase
in antibiotic resistance, the costs of bacterial STDs like gonorrhea may greatly
increase.52
49. Kristen Underhill, Risk-Taking and Rulemaking: Addressing Risk Compensation Behavior
through FDA Regulation of Prescription Drugs, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 377, 379 (2013).
50. Jill Blumenthal & Richard H. Haubrich, Risk Compensation in PrEP: An Old Debate Emerges
Yet Again, 16 AMA J. ETHICS 909, 910 (Nov. 2014) (“Furthermore, there has been an increase in
syphilis and gonorrhea rates in [men who have sex with men] across the United States, [much of
which is] among HIV-infected people, [perhaps] an unintended consequence of risk
compensation associated with greater access to and use of [antiretroviral therapy].”).
51. Joanna V. Theiss, It May Be Here to Stay, But Is It Working? The Implementation of the
Affordable Care Act through an Analysis of Coverage of HIV Treatment and Prevention, 12 J. HEALTH &
BIOMED. L. 109, 119 (2016).
52. Vladimir W. Sentome, Attacking the Hidden Epidemic: Why a Strict Liability Standard Should
Govern the Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Disease, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 409, 412.
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Empirical evidence of all these causal phenomena is hard to come by.
Public health scholars have argued that a decrease in stigma surrounding
HIV—part of which is attributable to the availability of HIV therapies—has
reduced safe-sex.53 And at least some empirical evidence exists of this
phenomenon in cases of both the pill and PrEP, though it is far from
conclusive.54
Of course, risk enhancement or compensation can take place with access
to other medication as well in other contexts. Drugs designed to promote
good health might lead to an increase in strenuous and risky activities;
vaccinations against the human papillomavirus (“HPV”) might also increase
risky behavior directly or by removing disincentives.55 Other studies have
looked at the risk compensation from Lyme disease vaccination.56 Nor does
risk compensation occur only with drug effects. Child-safe packaging
requirements can result in risk compensation, as parents might think that they
that they no longer need to keep medications outside children’s reach.57 The
key principle that defines these harms and on which I will expand in the next
Part, is that they are caused, not directly by the drug, but because an
intervening cause—the patient, for example—engages in some higher risk
behavior because of the drug.

53. See American Health Consultants, CDC Stats Show Unsafe Sex Practices Are Increasing, 4
AIDS ALERT 43, 43–45 (1999).
54. See Prior to the FDA’s approval of Truvada, health advocacy groups, including the AIDS
Healthcare Foundation, argued that the long-term costs of approving Truvada outweighed its
potential benefits. “[T]he AHF argued that the use of Truvada as PrEP would increase ‘risk
compensation’ among [men who have sex with men], meaning that users ‘may [forego] highly
effective and proven protective measures such as condoms in favor of a ‘magic pill’ that is far less
effective.” Jason Potter Burda, When Condoms Fail: Making Room Under the ACA Blanket for PrEP HIV
Prevention, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171, 188 (2015) (quoting Citizen Petition from Tom Myers,
Gen. Counsel, AIDS Healthcare Found., to the Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 5, 2012), https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2012-P-0226-0001 [http://perma.cc/L3C2-LLSW]);
see also Christian Grov et al., Willingness to Take PrEP and Potential for Risk Compensation Among
Highly Sexually Active Gay and Bisexual Men, 19 AIDS BEHAV. 2234, 2242 (2015) (finding that those
who chose to take PrEP were more likely to have receptive condomless anal intercourse, though
only ten percent of men who had not engaged in condomless anal intercourse said they now
would on PrEP, 23 percent reported it would decrease condom use overall, and 14 percent said
it would increase their condom use).
55. Coralia Vázquez-Otero et al., Dispelling the Myth: Exploring Associations between the HPV
Vaccine and Inconsistent Condom Use Among College Students, 93 PREVENTIVE MED. 147, 148–50
(2016) (finding that, in college students who had received the HPV vaccination, there was no
correlation with any change in condom use).
56. Noel T. Brewer et al., Risk Compensation and Vaccination: Can Getting Vaccinated Cause
People to Engage in Risky Behaviors?, 34 ANN. BEHAV. MED. 95, 95–99 (2007).
57. See W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC & PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
234–42 (1992) (arguing that the implementation of safety caps on aspirin bottles lulled people
into a false sense of safety, thereby undermining the utility of the regulation); W. KIP VISCUSI,
REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 73–80 (1984) (critiquing consumer product safety
regulation of child-resistant bottle caps).
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In most cases, the FDA does not analyze or attempt to mitigate the
indirect harms caused by drugs—though there are some examples when it
does. The Food & Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, which
specifically authorized the FDA to require Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategies (“REMS”), expanded this authority. These strategies allow the FDA
to require REMS both pre- and post-approval, require additional instructions
and training for providers, and labeling.
The REMS for PrEP seek to limit the indirect harms of drug use such as
risk compensation. During the advisory committee hearings, FDA personnel
emphasized that the “indication must be considered as only part of a
comprehensive prevention strategy to reduce the risk of HIV infection, and
that other preventive measures [such as condoms] should also be used.”58
Indeed, some speculated that risk compensation would not occur, and that
PrEP would encourage less risky behavior. Being on PrEP involves “ongoing
interaction with counselors, provision of HIV testing . . . [;] taking a pill a day
provide[s] a reminder, a daily reminder, of risk of HIV.”59 The presenters
noted that the clinical effectiveness studies revealed no risk compensation
behavior.60
B. THIRD-PARTY EFFECTS
Regulatory processes generally examine the effect of the drug on the
person who ingests it for the treatment of a particular condition. But
introducing drugs into an ecosystem can affect third parties or society in
general in various ways. Unintended third parties might ingest the drug
directly or be affected in other ways if they come into accidental contact with
the drug. The ripple effects of helping or harming a specific individual, for
example, may affect everyone with whom she comes in contact.
Another example of this dynamic occurs in the case of cost. Drugs that
make it easier or cheaper to treat a certain condition can allow resources to
be allocated elsewhere. The converse is true, as the case of Hepatitis C drugs
shows. In 2013, the FDA approved drugs that cure Hepatitis C, a chronic
condition that affects 3 million individuals.61 The drugs soon became
infamous for their price tag—$1000 per pill for a 12-week course, amounting
to $84,000 per treatment per individual. The relevant FDA committee did
not, of course, consider cost.

58. 1 FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, ANTIVIRAL DRUGS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE HEARINGS 242 (May 10, 2012) [hereinafter 1 Truvada Hearings]; see also id. at 153,
231, 239 (discussing comprehensive counseling need).
59. Id. at 112.
60. Id. at 76.
61. Jack Hoadley et al., The Cost of a Cure: Revisiting Medicare Part D and Hepatitis C Drugs,
HEALTH AFF. (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20161103.
057356/full [https://perma.cc/K4KG-9VRT].
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But Hepatitis C drugs have become a major drain on the health system
in the last two years. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services recently
reported that total drug spending in 2014 was up 11.3 percent for private
health insurance, 16.9 percent for Medicare patients, and 24.3 percent for
Medicaid patients, and noted that Hepatitis C drugs played a role in each
context.62 Overall national spending on drugs was up by about ten percent,
partially due to new drug treatments for Hepatitis C.63 In all, $18 billion in
2014 and 2015 combined was devoted to these drugs, of a total of $24 billion
of increased spending on drugs overall.64 Such costs are historically
unprecedented.65
This increase in spending has ramifications for various third parties. It
increases the premiums for private insurance, and the bill for the taxpayer.
More importantly, however, it has ramifications for others in public insurance
systems. As an analysis from two prominent health institutions notes, pricing
the drug at that level will raise the question of “whether or not cuts will be
made to education and transportation funds in state and federal budgets,
what other health care services we will provide less of, and where patients and
payers will find the money they need to access the drug.”66 In a world of zero
sum budgets, giving some individuals the benefit of the drug will harm the
benefits others can get. But the FDA does not take into account any of these
considerations.67
Notably, the Trump administration has recently taken steps to curb the
price of drugs—albeit not Hepatitis C drugs. As FDA Commissioner Scott
Gottlieb notes, the FDA “do[es]n’t have the authority to regulate prices, [it
does] have the authority—and the responsibility—to” promote competition.68
The FDA has therefore prioritized approval of generic competitors to existing

62. Id.
63. MURRAY AITKEN ET AL., MEDICINES USE AND SPENDING IN THE U.S.: A REVIEW OF 2015
AND OUTLOOK TO 2020, at 1–6 (2016), https://morningconsult.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/
04/IMS-Institute-US-Drug-Spending-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH4A-H82T].
64. Id.
65. See Margot Sanger-Katz, Why the Price of Sovaldi is a Shock to the System, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/upshot/why-the-price-of-sovaldi-is-a-shock-to-thesystem.html [https://perma.cc/3FMW-WSLQ].
66. Laura Fegraus & Murray Ross, Sovaldi, Harvoni, and Why It’s Different this Time, HEALTH
AFF. (Nov. 21, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/11/21/sovaldi-harvoni-and-why-itsdifferent-this-time [https://perma.cc/XVK9-5YQW].
67. See Frequently Asked Questions about CDER, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/
centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cder/faqsaboutcder/#16 [https://perma.cc/
8K2F-MNSU] (“We understand that high drug prices have a direct impact on patients-too many
American patients are priced out of the medicines they need. However, FDA has no legal
authority to investigate or control the prices set by manufacturers, distributors and retailers.”).
68. Scott Gottlieb, Reflections on a Landmark Year for Medical Product Innovation and Public
Health Advances and Looking Ahead to Policy in 2018, FDA VOICES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FDAVoices/ucm611998.htm [https://perma.cc/D2XJHB5H].
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drugs in various ways, setting new records for speed,69 with the acknowledged
goal of reducing the price of drugs.70
Other examples of third-party effects abound. The effects of risk
compensation can affect social norms more generally. PrEP, for example, has
been linked to evolving social norms regarding condom use.71 If PrEP
transforms norms among communities where condoms were often used, so
that people stop using condoms, then individuals not on PrEP may well feel
pressured not to use condoms, as commentators at the advisory committee
hearings noted.72 This, in turn, might put them at risk.
The FDA considers the effects on third parties in some contexts,
generally where Congress provides specific instructions to the FDA. Thus, in
making special children’s packaging for drugs, the FDA followed the
requirements laid out by the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970
(“PPPA”)73 to avoid harms to third parties (bystanding children). Similarly,
the NEPA requires environmental statements for certain drugs. Many drugs
produce environmental effects, flowing into groundwater and entering our

69. Michael Mehzer, FDA on Pace for Record Generic Approvals in 2018, REG. FOCUS (Sept. 4,
2018), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2018/9/fda-on-pace-for-recordgeneric-approvals-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/6296-M6LR].
70. Describing the steps the FDA has taken is beyond the scope of this Article. They are
described in some detail in Kathleen Craddock, Note, Improving Generic Drug Approval at the FDA,
7 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 421 (2018). See also MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, CTR.
FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH 3–4 (2017), available at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ManualofPolicies
Procedures/UCM407849.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2KM-XHXL] (setting out prioritization
standards for generics that would increase competition).
71. Liz Highleyman, “Raw Sex”: Are the Rules Changing?, THEBODY (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.thebody.com/article/raw-sex—are-the-rules-changing [https://perma.cc/W47RP44U]; see also Rod Knight et al., Complex and Conflicting Social Norms: Implications for Implementation
of Future HIV Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) Interventions in Vancouver, Canada, PLOS ONE, Jan. 12,
2016, at 1, 5–8.
72. 1 Truvada Hearings, supra note 58, at 262.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1471 (2012).
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food chain.74 The FDA requires a statement in only some cases.75 While such
impact statements are rare, they do occur.76
Another prominent example of the FDA’s work in the area is in antibiotic
resistance. The overprescription of antibiotics has led to resistant bacterial
strains that present grave public health dangers. Although administering a
drug would likely help a specific patient, it might also lead to the development
of resistant bacteria that can wreak great harm in the long run.77
The FDA regulated antibiotic resistance by attempting to limit the
overprescription of antibiotics. For example, when the FDA issued a
regulation prohibiting the extralabel use of certain antibiotics in 1996, it
explained that extralabel use was “capable of increasing the level of drug
resistant . . . pathogens” that affect humans, and therefore should be limited.
This, the FDA concluded, was an “adverse event” because it presented a “risk
to the public health.”78 The considerations here were both third-party
focused—to save undetermined lives who might suffer from antibiotic
resistant bacteria—and on indirect harms, as the harm is not immediately
caused by the antibiotic. Rather, other biological processes react to the
antibiotic, creating the problem. The issue is precisely that the antibiotic will
go from being effective in killing bacteria to no longer having any direct
effects.
C. NON-HEALTH EFFECTS
Drug approvals can have effects that are non-physiological—indeed, nonhealth—in nature. The extra costs of Hepatitis C, for example, can lead to
opportunity costs with respect to other kinds of government spending such as
transportation. But perhaps the clearest (and most controversial) examples

74. Oliver A.H. Jones et al., Aquatic Environmental Assessment of the Top 25 English Prescription
Pharmaceuticals, 36 WATER RES. 5013, 5018–20 (2002); see also Bent Halling-Sørensen et al.,
Occurrence, Fate and Effects of Pharmaceutical Substances in the Environment—A Review, 36
CHEMOSPHERE 357, 358, 365–66 (1998).
75. The guidance for example excludes situations where: (1) “FDA’s approval of the
application does not increase the use of the active moiety; (2) . . . increases the use of the active
moiety, but the estimated concentration of the substance at the point of entry into the aquatic
environment will be below 1 part per billion (ppb); (3) . . . does not alter significantly the
concentration or distribution of the substance, its metabolites, or degradation products in the
environment . . . .” FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN DRUG AND BIOLOGICS APPLICATIONS 2 (1998), https://www.fda.gov/
media/70809/download [https://perma.cc/F4AW-LV92].
76. Raanan A. Bloom & John C. Matheson III, Environmental Assessment of Avermectins by the
US Food and Drug Administration, 48 VETERINARY PARASITOLOGY 281, 282 (1993).
77. See National Institute of Health, Stop the Spread of Superbugs: Help Fight Drug-Resistant Bacteria,
NEWS HEALTH (Feb. 2014), https://newsinhealth.nih.gov/issue/feb2014/feature1 [https://
perma.cc/GB7Q-8HGH] (“[I]n recent decades, antibiotics have been losing their punch against
some types of bacteria. In fact, certain bacteria are now unbeatable with today’s medicines. Sadly,
the way we’ve been using antibiotics is helping to create new drug-resistant ‘superbugs.’”).
78. Extralabel Drug Use in Animals, 61 Fed. Reg. 57,732, 57,738 (1996).
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of the consideration of non-health effects are situations when moral and
political values appear to intrude in the drug approval process.
The last two decades present some interesting examples. The period’s
“[f]irst political drug approval” was RU486, the so-called abortion-pill. The
drug prevents the implantation of an embryo and is also taken to induce a
medical abortion within the first few weeks after conception.79 The saga of the
drug’s approval and the FDA’s behavior evinces political and value-laden
behavior on both sides of the political aisle.80
The drug was first approved in France in 1988. In 1989, the FDA
approved a policy that allowed individuals to bring drugs from abroad into
the country for their personal use.81 But apparently responding to pressure
from Congress,82 the FDA prohibited the import of RU486.83 A district court
found this decision “based not [on] any bonafide concern for the safety of
users of the drug, but on political considerations.”84 In congressional
hearings, George H.W. Bush’s FDA Commissioner claimed “that the agency
probably knew without contacting [scientists working on RU486] some of the
potential risks and benefits with respect to th[e] product,”85 prompting the
committee chairman to observe that the FDA was “basically offering
management by intuition to the American people.”86
The next year, on the second day of his presidency, Bill Clinton directed
the FDA to rescind the import ban on RU486.87 However, the holder of the
patent could find no manufacturer for the drug, delaying its approval by three
years. And the new FDA Commissioner’s confirmation was denied—until she
assured Republican leaders that she would not actively facilitate the final
79. James G. Dickinson, Mifeprex: FDA’s First “Political’ Drug Approval, 35 MED. MKTG. &
MEDIA, Nov. 2000, at 14.
80. Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifepristone Embroils the FDA in
Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571, 572–74 (2001).
81. See FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, Ch. 9 (1997), https://web.archive.org/
web/20030802233153/http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance_ref/rpm/default.htm; Peter S.
Reichertz & Melinda S. Friend, Hiding Behind Agency Discretion: The Food and Drug Administration’s
Personal Use Drug Importation Policy, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 493–94 (2000).
82. Mark A. Hernandez, RU-486; Safe? Effective? Banned! Why Would the Food and Drug
Administration Ban a Drug with Such Potential?, 11 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 653, 671 (1993).
83. “[O]n June 6, 1989, the FDA issued Import Alert 66-47, the basis for the seizure in this
case. The alert stated that RU486 was subject to ‘automatic detention’ and the agents should
‘[a]utomatically detain all shipments of unapproved abortifacient drugs.’” Benten v. Kessler, 799
F. Supp. 281, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
84. Id. But see Benten v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084, 1085 (1992) (per curiam) (affirming a stay
on the district court’s injunction against the FDA’s ban).
85. RU486: The Import Ban and Its Effect on Medical Research: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Regulation, Bus. Opportunities, and Energy, of the House Comm. on Small Bus., 101st Cong. 38 (1990)
(noting the reasons the FDA gave for the ban) (statement of Ronald Chesemore).
86. Id. at 43 (statement of Chairman Wyden).
87. Memorandum on Importation of RU-486, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 89 (Jan. 22,
1993), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1993-01-25/pdf/WCPD-1993-01-25-Pg89.pdf
[https://perma.cc/47S3-P3VS].
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approval of the drug.88 The FDA did, ultimately, fast track the drug’s approval,
under a regulation that allowed it to do so when a “serious or life-threatening
illness” is involved, by claiming that “unwanted pregnancy” fell into this
category.89
The RU486 saga was quickly followed by drama over Plan B during the
George W. Bush and Obama administrations. Plan B is a contraceptive that
operates before fertilization by, inter alia, hindering ovulation. Advocates
sought to render the drug an over-the-counter (“OTC”) medication. The FDA
(initially) issued a denial over the advice of numerous advisory committees.
As a court later found, this outcome by “the agency’s senior decisionmakers
. . . rest[ed] on improper concerns about the morality of adolescent sexual
activity.”90 This and other concerns, such as those over parental control,
became evident in a subsequent GAO Report which concluded that the FDA
had behaved unusually in denying OTC status to Plan B.91 Notably, the
Commissioner had appointed individuals such as David Hager, a religious
fundamentalist and vocal pro-lifer, to the FDA’s Reproductive Health Drugs
Advisory Committee, where he voted against OTC status and championed a
citizen petition from the group Americans United for Life.92
Lest I seem to suggest that it is solely social conservatives who seek to
deploy value judgments in FDA processes, the approval of the heart
medication BiDil, presents a counterexample.93 This drug was approved to

88. See Judy Mann, We Need the Abortion Pill Now, WASH. POST (June 23, 2000),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/2000/06/23/we-need-the-abortion-pill-now/
d5190008-9de6-4d77-acd5-71af382e8b73 [https://perma.cc/GND6-HBGM]; Katharine Q.
Seelye, House Votes to Block FDA on Approval of Abortion Pill, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 1998), https://
www.nytimes.com/1998/06/25/us/house-votes-to-block-fda-on-approval-of-abortion-pill.html
[https://perma.cc/3LGK-7QAT].
89. See New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Products; Accelerated Approval
Procedures, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,958 (Dec. 11, 1992) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. pt.
314(H)); see also PRESCRIBER’S AGREEMENT FORM, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CENTER
FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH (2001).
90. Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
91. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DECISION PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR OVERTHE-COUNTER MARKETING OF THE EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL 7–11,
42–46 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06109.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7K58-VJVW] (providing timeline of internal FDA actions on the Plan B OTC switch application);
id. at 51–52 (incorporating a memorandum from the Director of the Office of New Drugs noting
moral concerns regarding adolescent sexual activity and parental control raised by the Plan B
OTC switch application).
92. Rick Weiss, New Status for Embryos in Research, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2002, at A1.
93. Note, of course that sometimes liberal administrations appear to have similar priorities.
The Obama HHS arguably treated Plan B no better than the Bush administration. Lisa Heinzerling,
The FDA’s Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 927, 938–39 (2014).
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treat cardiac failure in African Americans, and was the first drug to be targeted
to a specific racial group.94
The fundamental question in the BiDil approval story was not safety and
efficacy, which was already established. Rather, what was at issue was social
policy about race more generally. First, there was the question of the impact
on racial health equity. Some “influential black political and scientific groups
embraced BiDil . . . as a way to redress years of inequality in medical treatment
and outcomes.”95 The trials for BiDil included a large cohort of AfricanAmericans as the result of intensive recruitment.96 In a world where AfricanAmericans were traditionally underrepresented in clinical trials, often due to
poor recruitment, racialized medicine offered some benefits.
On the other hand, racial health inequity mostly has structural causes.97
And as Dorothy Roberts observes, such “racial medicine” can divert attention
away from these root causes “toward genetic explanations and technological
solutions.”98 Popularizing racialized medicine can thus exacerbate bad health
among minorities.
More generally, even if the drug worked better for one race than another,
“critics said that endorsing a drug for one race gave official government
imprimatur to the discredited notion of race as a biological category.”99
Without such affirmation, racial categories remained fluid. As one witness
before the FDA Advisory Committee asked: “Who is African-American?
. . . Are we going to allow people to self-identify? Is the physician going to be
the one that says you are black? . . . Are there going to be criteria, national
standardized criteria for how people identify individuals for the treatment of

94. Stephanie Saul, FDA Approves Heart Drug for African-Americans, N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/health/fda-approves-a-heart-drug-for-african
americans.html [https://perma.cc/E2J7-328G].
95. Id. Dorothy Roberts observes of this tension, “‘Is race-based medicine good for us?’ is at
once a medical and political question, and the answer depends on one’s approach to achieving
racial equality. There is no consensus among African Americans on this question.” Dorothy E.
Roberts, Is Race-Based Medicine Good for Us?: African American Approaches to Race, Biomedicine, and
Equality, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 537, 538 (2008).
96. See Sharona Hoffman, ‘Racially-Tailored’ Medicine Unraveled, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 395, 402
(2005); see also Britt M. Rusert & Charmaine D.M. Royal, Grassroots Marketing in a Global Era: More
Lessons from BiDil, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 79, 81–82 (2011).
97. Roberts, supra note 95, at 542.
98. Id.
99. Saul, supra note 94; see also Howard Brody & Linda M. Hunt, BiDil: Assessing a Race-Based
Pharmaceutical, 4 ANN. FAM. MED. 556, 557 (2006); Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, Legal
Regulation of the Use of Race in Medical Research, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 535, 536 (2006); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Law, Race, and Biotechnology: Toward a Biopolitical and Transdisciplinary Paradigm, 9 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 150 (2013); Carolyn Johnson, Should Medicine Be Colorblind?: Debate Erupts
Over a Drug That Works Better in African-Americans, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 24, 2004), http://
archive.boston.com/news/globe/health_science/articles/2004/08/24/should_medicine_be_
colorblind [https://perma.cc/W6UX-NC26].
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BiDil?”100 Even more problematic, the scientific validity of such categories was,
and remains, dubious: There is so much variation within racial categories that
biological race is a poor predictor for medical outcomes. As one scientist put
it, “[y]ou might as well sort people by height.”101 In this situation in particular,
the drug was designated for self-identified African-Americans, which would
exacerbate inaccuracies. Indeed, the science is all the more problematic given
that the trials never included other races except for self-identified AfricanAmericans.102 The generic components of BiDil had long been used to treat
medication among people of all races.
Drugs therefore implicate important values that play a role in the
approval process. It is important to consider whether and how to incorporate
these considerations within the process.
D. SHORTCOMINGS
As my examples above show, the FDA does, sometimes, take into account
effects that are non-physiological. However, such assessments are often sui
generis, or not carried out in a way that is systematized, clear, and cogent. As a
result, physiological concerns tend to dominate.
For example, a review of the PrEP hearings shows shortcomings in
various areas, including (a) a failure to obtain clear data regarding nonphysiological effects; (b) a failure to assess and analyze the empirical and
ethical implications of the data that was made available; (c) a failure to adjust
the process so that assessments of this non-physiological data could be taken
into account; and (d) a failure to extent a similar review in other contexts.
1. Lack of Collection of Data or Assessment of Concerns
First, data on non-physiological effects such as risk-compensation had just
not been collected. As presenters themselves had noted, the lack of risk
compensation in the studies probably reflected the “enormous amounts of
risk reduction counseling that people received and the condoms” as part of
the study.103 Thus, is was hard to draw any conclusions.
Next, when data or concerns were presented, there was limited
assessment, both empirical or ethical. For example, several nurses, who
specialized in HIV care, commented on the proceedings. They were nearly

100. 2 FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, CARDIOVASCULAR AND RENAL DRUGS
ADVISORY COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON APPROVAL OF BIDIL 250 (2005) [hereinafter BiDil Hearings].
101. Abigail Zuger, From Bang to Whimper: A Heart Drug’s Story, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/25/science/from-bang-to-whimper-a-heart-drugs-story.html
[https://perma.cc/QJ3J-HGNV].
102. BiDil Hearings, supra note 100, at 60; see also Shiloh Krupar & Nadine Ehlers, Biofutures:
Race and the Governance of Health, 35 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 222, 223 (2017); Osagie K.
Obasogie, The Return of Biological Race: Regulating Innovations in Race and Genetics Through
Administrative Agency Race Impact Assessments, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 4 (2012).
103. 1 Truvada Hearings, supra note 58, at 76.
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unanimous in their opinion that risk compensation would be a serious
problem.104 They cited studies in which a sizeable number of respondents
acknowledged that they would stop using condoms were PrEP widely
available.105 But the implications were never discussed.
Two other public commenters were concerned by cost, but members
never discussed their concerns. As one commenter explained, ensuring that
someone who lived with HIV took the drug would reduce transmission as their
viral load would be reduced.106 Ensuring more people with HIV took the drug
would therefore reduce transmission far more than giving the drug to
someone who may or may not encounter someone who was HIV positive. To
get the same effect, one would have to spend a lot more money.107 However,
their concerns were never discussed. Yet another commenter discussed how
PrEP would change the norms of condom use: “[I]t will make it even harder
for people, especially women, to” negotiate condom use with their partners
to “protect themselves.”108 That concern was also unaddressed.
As importantly, the ethical aspects of risk compensation were never
assessed. A couple of commenters noted that risk compensation concerns
were paternalistic: “[C]lients are capable of making healthy decisions for their
own lives [and] . . . don’t require our paternalizing them.”109 This was a valid
response but was left unaddressed by committee members.
Thus a representative of the AIDS Health Foundation did not exaggerate
when he complained on the second day of the hearings that “[t]estimonials
on risk compensation, and cost . . . were all but ignored.”110 Apart from
passing observations noting the lack of data on risk compensation early on in
the proceedings, the members of the committee ignored most nonphysiological concerns. This is hardly surprising: Apart from a solitary social
worker, the committee consisted of medical doctors and researchers with
advanced degrees in biology and chemistry (and no nurses).111
104. Id. at 262; see also id. at 264, 265, 269, 330–31 (“Using this treatment as a preventive
measure for HIV will be seen as a medical condom.”).
105. Id. at 262.
106. Those with suppressed viral loads are unable to transmit the virus. 10 Things to Know
About HIV Suppression, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://
www.niaid.nih.gov/news-events/10-things-know-about-hiv-suppression [https://perma.cc/YDM8UT2K].
107. 1 Truvada Hearings, supra note 58, at 282–83, 318 (“[Far more than ensuring] this
means the cost of preventing just one HIV infection over one-year period of time will be well over
$500,000. This figure is approximately 20 times higher than the cost of treating an HIV-positive
person for one year.”).
108. Id. at 322.
109. Id. at 341–42, 509–10 (“[H]aunted by a certain specter of what I would characterize as
maybe an undercurrent of anger and fear at people who don’t or can’t or won’t use condoms”
and recommending “patient empowerment.”).
110. See 2 FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, ANTIVIRAL DRUGS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE HEARINGS 197 (May 11, 2012).
111. 1 Truvada Hearings, supra note 58, at 2–12.
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2. Failure of Process to Incorporate Data into Concerns
Next, members of the committee noted that even if members had
concerns on non-physiological effects on the patients taking the drug, such as
the development of viral resistance among third parties, the voting process
did not systematically incorporate those concerns. As one member noted, “the
vote, to a certain extent, hinges on what the REM[S] looks like” but
complained that the committee could not make their vote conditional on
“chang[ing] the REM[S].”112 Another member similarly criticized the all-ornothing choice: “I just don’t think it’s a good logic to say, our choice is either
don’t approve and let them use it off-label, or approve it with something we
know is not going to be very effective in actually changing behavior.”113 The
members sought “good data about what’s going on” with respect to nonphysiological criteria not based on “voluntary [self-]assessment.”114 But given
that the only systematic data available was on physiological side-effects and
effectiveness, members appear to have voted on that basis.
3. Lack of Systematization Across Drugs
Finally, the PrEP committee did not follow a systematic assessment of the
kinds of harms across drugs. Indeed, Dr. Susan Buchbinder, a presenter in
the PrEP committee hearings joked about this fact: When it comes to statins,
for example, there “hasn’t been a lot of concern about risk compensation.
We’re not asking people, are people who are on statins going to be eating
more ice cream?”115 Notably, the question of risk compensation came up in
another case—approval of Plan B, where the FDA did review numerous risk
compensation studies to determine whether the approval would result in
higher sexual activity (and greater STI contraction) in adolescent women.
“Reviewers analyzed the actual use data as well as data from five other studies”
cumulatively with “more than 11,000 enrollees” and found no appreciable
risk compensation behavior.116
Even when it comes to a specific concern—risk compensation—the
FDA’s behavior varies across drugs. Some of the other harms to which I
alluded to above—packaging for children or environmental impact—are
congressionally mandated instructions rather than any systematic effort by the
FDA to assess third-party effects.

112. Id. at 440, 505 (statement of Member Padian).
113. Id. at 482 (statement of Member Morrato).
114. Id. at 470 (statement of Member Padian).
115. Id. at 49.
116. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 531 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); see also id. at 528 (“[T]he
results of the AUS [actual use study] demonstrated that the frequency of unprotected sex did
not increase, condom use did not decrease, and the overall use of effective contraception did
not decrease [with use of Plan B].” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting
Defendant’s Exhibit)).
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As a result, when the FDA engages in these kinds of assessment, it creates
the danger that it has to do more with unstated political agendas and special
interests—concerns around children—for example, then a systematic
assessment. Why indeed, one might ask as Dr. Buchbinder did, are we so
concerned with risk compensation involving an HIV drug but not when it
comes to statins—might HIV stigma be the answer? And why do non-health
concerns suddenly become an issue when a drug involves a certain racial
minority or women’s reproduction?
The key here is to admit that our concerns about drugs collateral effects
are not limited to their unintended physiological effects on their recipients.
Rather, drugs, like other medical phenomena, have ramifications that extends
beyond their immediate physiological effect into the social realm.
Understanding and categorizing these effects, working out when, and why we
should take them into account, are important to addressing these concerns
explicitly.
IV.

THE ETHICAL CASE FOR CONSIDERING ‘OTHER’ SIDE-EFFECTS

The categories I lay out above are somewhat fuzzy and unelaborated. In
what follows, I more fully flesh out my understanding of indirect harms, group
harms, and non-health effects, and the ethical issues they raise. As I explain,
ethical considerations do not undermine, and indeed, may justify, the
consideration of other side-effects. As ethical considerations undergird legal
policy, especially around medical research and practice, they are an important
precursor to additional policy considerations.
A. INDIRECT HARMS
The first question concerns whether only direct effects or indirect effects
of a particular health decision should be taken into account in FDA
decisionmaking. The first task is to distinguish between direct and indirect
harms.117
There are two approaches to this distinction. The first is the “purpose”
approach, which bioethicist Dan Brock advocates. Brock explains: “[T]he
direct benefit[] of opening a large, new primary care clinic [is] the improved
primary health care . . . the consequence that the hospital’s cafeteria is no

117. Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity
in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1771 (2002) (“[T]he
very act of regulating the target risk itself brings about ancillary risks.”). The authors proceed to
give examples, but don’t expand beyond that definition, apart from acknowledging later that any
substitution effects, where an entity substitutes one harmful substance for another, “is more
mediated.” Id. at 1775. Substitution effects are likely mitigated in the drug context given the
FDA’s control over approval.
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longer unprofitable . . . is an indirect benefit, even if it may be as closely
causally related.”118
But this approach seems somewhat counterintuitive. Imagine two
scenarios. Under the first, I ask my nurse to tell my doctor to talk to the
pharmacist who adjusts my course of medication per my wishes. Under the
second, I talk to the pharmacist, and achieve the same result. It seems fair to
say that the latter approach achieved the same goal as the former, but more
directly. Directness here is clearly not measured by goal.
Indeed, measuring directness by purpose would collapse all side-effects
into indirect effects. Whether a purpose is a side-effect or a target effect is
generally determined by the purpose of the drug.119 Any effect of a drug that
is not intended would therefore be both a side- and an indirect-effect.
The better alternative is the causal approach. Tort law uses this approach,
for example, to determine proximate causation. In inquiring whether a cause
is proximate enough to be tortious, a minority of jurisdictions use what is
called the direct causation test. Under that test, a cause is indirect if it is
separated from an effect by an intervening cause. This intervening cause must
(1) be independent of the original act, (2) be a voluntary human act or an
abnormal natural event, and (3) occur in time between the original act and
the effect.120
To take a few examples: The risk compensation behavior that comes from
PrEP would be an example of an indirect harm of administering the
medication. Condomless sex would be an independent, voluntary, and
intervening behavior of various individuals which could result in increased
non-HIV STD transmission. Similarly, the effects of expensive Hepatitis C
drugs on the availability of other forms of care or state spending will be
indirect. The expense of the drug will trigger a range of other independent
decisions on where to cut costs because of the high cost of the drug. In
contrast, the harm BiDil opponents point to, appears direct. The expressive
racial offense and categorization occurs at the time of approval and is
reinforced anytime anyone takes the drug because they are African-American.
Even under my definition, however, one might argue that considering
indirect effects violates bioethical principle. For example, imagine that a
doctor and murderer are both fatally ill, and there is only enough of a drug
to save one person. The doctor, if saved, would heal numerous people; the
murderer would kill again.121 Still, valuing people based on what they can

118. Dan W. Brock, Separate Spheres and Indirect Benefits, 1 COST EFFECTIVENESS & RESOURCE
ALLOCATION, Feb. 2003, at 4.
119. As in the regulatory context. See, e.g., Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 117, at 1766–67.
120. See 21 PERSONAL INJURY—ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 101.06 (2019); Tampa Elec.
Co. v. Jones, 190 So. 26, 27 (Fla. 1939).
121. The example is mine, the reasons are Brock’s. See generally Brock, supra note 118
(describing the distinction between direct and indirect benefits). Brock lays these out as three
reasons, but they effectively boil down to two. Id. He presents the equality claim as two separate
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provide society treats them as means (to these other purposes) and therefore
violates the Kantian approaches that dominate bioethical reasoning.
Accordingly, some argue, individuals should be given access to the resource
equally. A better system would be to give them both an equal chance to get
access to the medication—for example, through a lottery system.122
This position merits two responses. First, many would argue that Kant,
himself, would seek to choose among the doctor and murderer based on a
theory of moral desert. While the consequentialist would choose the doctor
because she cares about effects, Kant might pick among them because of their
past behavior. Similarly, someone who subscribes to the principle “priority for
the worse-off” would see the sicker of the two as more deserving of treatment.
A luck egalitarian would provide treatment to the patient who is least to blame
for her illness.123 Exponents of other ideologies might tell the FDA not to
consider indirect effects, but rather, other moral criteria when making
decisions. Which illness has the “sickest” people; which group of patients or
manufacturers are the most morally deserving. These criteria, however, are
better relegated to “non-health” related considerations that I raise in the final
Section.
Suffice it to say, however, that whatever one’s predilections,
consequentialism is a sufficiently dominant form of ethical reasoning that its
touchstone—indirect effects of a drug—is a plausible parameter for FDA
reasoning in this context. It does not, at least, present an ethical bar for the
FDA to take into account these effects.124
The second response concerns the great complexity of our healthcare
system that makes such consequentialist, indirect-effect based reasoning
inevitable. Let us say that Medicaid allocates a certain set of resources to
Hepatitis C treatment. This will indirectly affect those in need of, say, diabetes
medication because social resources are finite. Thus, we must respect the

claims: Treating people differently disrespects their equal moral worth as humans. Id. at 7. Second,
it disregards their “equal moral claims” as human beings to obtaining health rights. Id.
122. Equity here can differ based on various approaches. We might say that all individuals
deserve an equal amount of the benefit. Alternatively, we might say that equity demands that the
worse off should get more of the benefit. For a full discussion of the equity considerations that
these so-called egalitarian versus prioritarian approaches raise, see generally R. George Wright,
Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, 34 L. & INEQ. 1 (2016) (discussing equity considerations).
See Dan W. Brock, Health Resource Allocation for Vulnerable Populations, in ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
HEALTH POLICY 283 (Marion Danis et al. eds., 2002).
123. Indeed, Brock engages in a sleight of hand. In critiquing effects-based reasoning, he
takes as a premise moral theories that deny the moral relevance of effects based reasoning. Brock,
supra note 118, at 5–9. Consequentialism, which accepts effects-based reasoning, is, per his
assumptions, made irrelevant. But of course, when the chosen moral theory or theories treat
effects as irrelevant, it is hardly surprising when effects in fact prove to be irrelevant.
124. Note if the FDA bans the drug altogether, there are no equity issues. All individuals
would be treated alike; none would have access to the drug. Nor would we treat individuals as
means. Rather the denial would be based not on the behavior of specific individuals, but on social
effects as a whole.
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principle of equal worth, not just among potential Hepatitis C patients, but
between potential Hepatitis C and diabetes patients: Individuals in both groups
have equal worth. Medicaid would have to consider and adjust for the likely
indirect effects of allocating resources to one drug over another.
To put it more starkly, assume the doctor had Hepatitis C and the
murderer had diabetes. Let us say that a decisionmaker allocates the Hepatitis
C drug (sofosbuvir) for the doctor. Future decisionmakers would have to
decide whether and how to allocate diabetes drugs to the murderer given that
the allocation of sofosbuvir to the doctor depleted resources. Thus, when
deciding whether to allocate sofosbuvir to the doctor in the first place, the
original decisionmaker should consider the equal claim of the diabetes
patient. Some consequentialism seems inevitable in the allocational context.
B. THIRD-PARTY EFFECTS
Third-party harm occurs when the drug is prescribed for use, and actually
used by person A, but person B is harmed by the use either directly or
indirectly.125 Those harmed by secondhand smoke suffer direct third-party
harms; those affected by antibiotic resistance suffer indirect third-party harms.
The primary purpose of the FDA’s regulation of side-effects has been to
protect the recipient of the drug, person A, from harm. Approval only occurs
if the benefit of the drug to its recipient outweighs its cost to her.126
In considering the duties the FDA might owe to these third parties, it is
useful to distinguish between micro-, meso-, and macro-ethics.127 Although
this set of distinctions does not neatly separate ethical questions, it provides a
frame around which to organize our analysis.
Micro-ethics focuses on individual obligations and duties. For example,
the duties individual researchers owe specific patients is a micro-level
concern. The focus of the FDA has been on the micro-level—on the well-being
of the drug recipient herself. However, slowly moving beyond the recipient to
meso- and macro-levels invoke an even more complex web of obligations.
Meso-level ethics concern the duties of specific institutions or groups visa-vis each other. This includes the duties owed to a particular group of
patients, clan, or tribal entity. At the meso-level, there are bonds of obligation
125. I note that potential users do not count as third parties. A burglar who steals drugs from
a pharmacy is not a third party as there was no primary party to whom his use is incident.
126. One might argue that by limiting the availability of the drug to non-patients by
maintaining prescription standards, the FDA does in fact regulate third parties. However, those
individuals are not third parties as there is no principal party—a Party A—who is taking the drug
in that context.
127. See generally Craig Konnoth, Health Information Equity, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1317 (2017)
(considering approaches to justice within limited circumscribed contexts, and then at a more
general level beyond that context). This definition maps on to similar approaches in sociological
inquiry and political theory as well. JONATHAN H. TURNER, CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 27 (2012); John T. Rourke, Levels of Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON THE WORLD
STAGE 65 (10th ed. 2005).
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between the individual and certain groups that surround her—her family for
example. Third-party harms at the meso-level might violate these obligations.
The effects of secondhand smoke on family members is one such example.
Macro-level ethics concerns duties owed to entire states, nations, or
global entities. Macro-level harms occur at a more systematic level. Because
person A received access to medication for Hepatitis C, Medicaid can no
longer treat persons B through Z for their less expensive but no less
threatening ailments. Antibiotic resistance is an example of a global threat.
As one progresses up from meso to macro levels of analysis, the bonds of
obligation seem to loosen. The obligations owed to a stranger that is yet to be
born but will suffer from a patient’s frequent antibiotic use seem more
attenuated than those owed to one’s roommate.128 Rather, in our society we
are more likely to think that those duties are mediated by broader social
institutions. The individual may have a responsibility to vote responsibly to
ensure an administration that considers harms to all of society as well as to
future generations. But we are less likely to think (though of course, some do)
that the individual owes a duty directly to those people.
The FDA, we all agree, must engage in micro-ethical analysis by
considering the burdens on and duties to the individual who takes the drug.
The FDA is also the governmental entity (or at least, one of the entities) that
mediates the individual’s relationship with the collective at the macro-level. It
must consider its responsibilities to the collective, to society in general, when
engaging in drug regulatory actions. It should be responsible for enforcing
macro-level justice considerations such as equality that take into account the
worth and needs of all individuals in society as well as to future societies.
The place where the FDA’s intervention seems the most dubious is at the
meso-level. Should the FDA adopt a duty of care to the various groups that
surround the patient—their family, friends, and other circles of intimates?
First, some may say that at the meso-level, visions of the good, rather than the
just, govern.129 The obligations are those of friendship and love. The FDA’s
intervention would displace the primary obligations between intimates.
128. The duties owed to strangers is the subject of a rich philosophical debate that I do not
plumb in depth here. See generally THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE: MORALITY AND THE DISTANT NEEDY
(Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 2004); Richard Arneson, Consequentialism vs. Special-Ties Partiality, 86
MONIST 382 (2003); Deen K. Chatterjee, Moral Distance: Introduction, 86 MONIST 327 (2003);
Wendy C. Hamblet, The Geography of Goodness: Proximity’s Dilemma and The Difficulties of Moral
Response to the Distant Sufferer, 86 MONIST 355 (2003); Violetta Igneski, Distance, Determinacy and
the Duty to Aid: A Reply to Kamm, 20 L. & PHIL. 605 (2001) (discussing duties owed to strangers);
Frances Kamm, Does Distance Matter Morally to the Duty to Rescue?, 19 L. & PHIL. 655 (2000); Jan
Narveson, We Don’t Owe Them a Thing! A Tough-minded but Soft-hearted View of Aid to the Far Away
Needy, 86 MONIST 419 (2003); Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229
(1972); Jeremy Waldron, Who Is my Neighbor?: Humanity and Proximity, 86 MONIST 333 (2003).
129. See generally Sarah E.M. Caldwell & Nicholas Mays, Studying Policy Implementation Using a
Macro, Meso, and Micro Frame Analysis: The Case of the Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research
& Care (CLAHRC) Programme Nationally and in North West London, 10 HEALTH RES. & POL’Y SYS. 32
(2012) (discussing the potential for misunderstanding and misinterpretation at the meso-level).
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Second, some might argue that FDA intervention would displace the
obligations that local government bodies owe their citizens.
This second objection I deal with in the final Part. The first objection is
not very convincing. The federal government’s duty—via its drug regulatory
body, namely, the FDA—does not dissipate merely because other bonds of
obligation are present. Limiting the FDA’s intervention would be harmful
where drug recipients do not live up to their obligations to others because
they are selfish, amoral, or unable (for example, if they are addicted to a
specific drug). And it would be impossible for the FDA to predict and
intervene only where private obligations fail. Finally, even at the macro-level
there are other bonds beyond the dry dictates of justice. Patriotism, for
example, is an emotive bond that supposedly unites groups together. But we
do not deny the impracticality and implausibility of relying on such ideals
when it comes to government functioning.
Note that the considerations of micro-, meso-, and macro-ethics do not
always point in the same direction. The interests of the individual and of those
around her might be at loggerheads. In the case of BiDil, for example, some
commentators explicitly recognized that the drug could increase racial
polarization. But, nonetheless, they apparently felt that the benefits to the
individual outweighed the social costs.130 One can imagine a range of other
examples—Hepatitis C patients would benefit from even an expensive drug,
even if others reliant on social services may suffer. Those who have access to
PrEP may enjoy the benefits of unsafe sex—but changing norms about safe
sex will harm those who do not have access to the medication. Scholars note
that if norms about safe sex change, such individuals may feel reluctant to
demand condom use.131
In such cases, the FDA may have to engage in balancing the interests of
the individual versus society. This balancing is familiar in judicial and other
agency contexts. Ideally, for example, the FDA would have been able to take
into account the astronomical cost of the Hepatitis C drug. Under existing
law, states are required to provide “medically necessary” care, including
available and approved drugs, to their Medicaid population. Individuals have
successfully sued to receive access to the treatment post-approval, inevitably

130. Leah Sammons, Racial Profiling: Not Always a Bad Thing, CHI. DEFENDER, Feb. 9, 2006;
Gary Puckrein, BiDil: From Another Vantage Point, 25 HEALTH AFF. w368, w374 (2006).
131. See Burda, supra note 54, at 187 (documenting an argument from AHF, the AIDS
Healthcare Foundation, who argued “that Truvada’s efficacy must be measured against the
ninety-five percent efficacy of proper and regular condom usage”); see also J.L. Peterson et al.,
Perceived Condom Norms and HIV Risks Among Social and Sexual Networks of Young African American
Men Who Have Sex with Men, 24 HEALTH EDUC. RES. 119, 122–26 (2009) (finding that men who
believed that their friends used condoms, or would approve of them using condoms, were much
more likely to use condoms and not engage in other high risk sexual behaviors).
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stretching their budgets and limiting coverage.132 A more ethical approach
might have been to assess the cost to society before approval.
At other times, the interests of the individual and society run together.
For example, unsafe sexual norms can ultimately harm even those on PrEP.
They may contract other STDs. And as the incidence of HIV in the rest of the
population rises, even those who were once on PrEP might contract HIV if
their adherence falters or they lose access to the drug—if they lose insurance
for example. In such cases, the FDA’s mandate seems much clearer.
C. NON-HEALTH EFFECTS
Drugs might produce direct or indirect effects that are not health related,
in the sense of producing physiological effects. The racist message that the
approval or prescription of a drug like BiDil produces would be a direct but
non-health harm. Similarly, a medication that tastes good produces direct
benefits for a patient of a kind that we would not ordinarily call health related.
But many non-health harms are indirect—limits to transportation and
education, for example, because of the high cost of Hepatitis C drugs.
Two relevant questions arise when determining whether the FDA can
consider non-health (i.e., in this case, non-physiological) effects: (1) Should
the FDA ethically consider non-health concerns in making its decision?;
(2) Can we draw a coherent line to draw between health and non-health
concerns?
In previous work, I have taken a position that would appear to militate
against the FDA taking into account non-physiological effects. As I have
explained, “[e]veryday moral reasoning assesses a particular activity based on
the norms of the context or institution in which it is situated—the particular
law school, family, or community. We decide if that is ‘the way we do things
here.’”133 As theorists such as Michael Walzer argue, the nature, purpose, and
shared understandings of a particular social situation—or to use Walzerian
terminology, “sphere[] of justice”134—help determine the normative import
of a particular action. We assess the functioning of the criminal justice system
by how well it achieves certain penological goals, of a family by the bonds of
love and care that pervade it. It would be strange to flip this approach and
assess family functioning by how well wrongdoers in the family are punished,
and the criminal justice system by measuring bonds of caring.
Not only would it be strange, I have argued more recently, but it would
be dangerous to do so. For example, using the language of consumerism to
define healthcare interactions, undermines fiduciary relationship between
132. Ed Silverman, State Medicaid Programs Continue to Restrict Access to Hepatitis C Drugs, STAT
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/11/14/medicaid-hepatitis-gilead
[https://perma.cc/XBS7-QZQ6].
133. Konnoth, supra note 127, at 1352.
134. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY (1983) (offering a theory of justice based upon various spheres of justice).
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doctor and patient: Doctors might “becom[e] a shill for their consumer
patient.”135 As studies have shown, in medical contexts, patients behave
differently than in consumer contexts. They defer to doctors, and assume that
the doctor shares their goals, and has expertise: “[A]n individual undergoing
medical care is often not fully capable of making the best medical decisions
and is dependent on those around her.”136 Maintaining a separate sphere in
which medical action takes place, I have argued, is therefore essential to serve
important ethical goals.
In the case of the FDA, the courts similarly seem to distinguish between
health related and non-health related considerations. Take POM Wonderful v.
Coca-Cola.137 That case concerned whether a company could bring a
mislabeling claim under the Lanham Act against a competitor to protect its
commercial interests, or whether such a mislabeling claim when it applied to
a product regulated under the FDCA was precluded. The Supreme Court
concluded that “the Lanham Act and the FDCA . . . each [have their] own
scope and purpose.138 Both touch on food and beverage labeling, but the
Lanham Act protects commercial interests against unfair competition, while
the FDCA protects public health and safety.” Similarly, the district court in
Tummino v. Von Eschenbach excoriated the FDA for showing “bad faith” and
“improper concerns about the morality of adolescent sexual activity.”139
Further, the FDA has itself, on numerous occasions, sought to deny
consideration of non-health effects—even as it so often takes them into
account. In the Tummino case, the court recounts how numerous agency staffs
noted that apart from the fact that the evidence showed concerns about sexual
activity were groundless, considering ethical issues was beyond their
mandate.140 Similarly, in approving the human growth hormone, the advisory
committee concluded that “that once demonstrated to be safe and effective,
the choice of whether to attempt therapy for, for example, baldness, or mild
acne, or even overweight is up to doctors, patients and their families as they
weigh the potential benefits of the therapy against the potential risks.”141

135. Craig J. Konnoth, Transparency Versus Informed Consent: The Patient/Consumer Paradigms,
in TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 75, 78 (Barbara Evans et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2019).
136. Id.
137. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2231 (2014).
138. Id.
139. Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 233 (2006).
140. Id.
141. Matt Lamkin, Regulating Identity: Medical Regulation as Social Control, 2016 BYU L. REV.
501, 536 (quoting FDA, ENDOCRINOLOGIC AND METABOLIC DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
MEETING (2003)).
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Similarly, when it came to animal cloning, the FDA emphatically noted that it
could not consider “moral, religious, or ethical issues.”142
Despite the weight of this authority, two considerations counsel the
broadening of the FDA’s approach, from considering only physiological
effects to ethical and political considerations. The first set of considerations
concerns the malleability of medical understanding. The second concerns the
institutional place of the FDA as a political entity.
First, while it is important to maintain medical practice as a separate
sphere of human activity, our understandings of its reach evolve over time.
Indeed, ethical concerns, such as those about patient autonomy, and practices
which seek to vindicate those concerns, such as informed consent, were
historically absent from routine medical practice; today, they have become a
bedrock.143 The so-called “bioethics revolution,” that today characterizes
medical practice and medical research, deeply concerns the FDA, which
monitors both research studies, and the outcomes of clinical practice.144
Considering the ethical results of drug approval is emphatically part of “the
way we do things here.”145
Take one example: In the context of drugs that lead to human
enhancement, scholars have argued that the FDA should take into account
ethical and normative concerns. Dov Fox, for example, points out that the
FDA Advisory Committee ignored the ethical considerations the American
Association of Pediatrics raised regarding the human growth hormone,
relating to the prejudice shorter individuals might face.146 As Fox explains,
enhancement drugs raise a host of non-health related, but ethical concerns,
including “unfairness in competitive activities, inequality of access to
positional advantages, perpetuation of social prejudice, threats to individual
agency, identity, and authenticity, social conformity and subtle coercion, and
negative externalities when such technologies are pursued collectively.”147
As we gradually reexamine the role of medical entities, we might also
engage in policy change that would more firmly ground the FDA’s action.
Thus, Fox, along with a range of other ethicists, have therefore urged that the
FDA consider the ethical harms these drugs create. Fox suggests a separate
“administrative process” within the FDA.148 Others have urged the creation of
142. FDA’s Response to Public Comment on the Animal Cloning Risk Assessment, Risk Management
Plan, and Guidance for Industry, FDA, www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/Animal
Cloning/ucm055491.htm [https://perma.cc/R3CV-TZZU].
143. See generally ROBERT BAKER, BEFORE BIOETHICS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL
ETHICS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE BIOETHICS REVOLUTION (2013) (providing a
historical overview of ethical developments in the medical field).
144. See, e.g., FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/safety/fdas-sentinel-initiative
[https://perma.cc/2B4C-5FCH] (last updated May 21, 2018).
145. Konnoth, supra note 127, at 1352.
146. Fox, supra note 14, at 1183–84.
147. Id. at 1195.
148. Id. at 1194–97.
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new regulatory entities, such as an “ethics review board”—effectively an
additional advisory committee to “provide comparable advice on the ethical
and social dimensions of the agency’s actions.”149
Fox and others are taking already-existing widely shared understandings
about how one practices medicine and research—claims of autonomy,
authenticity, equity, and justice—and showing how those existing norms apply
in the FDA context. However, these norms, as I noted above, developed
through transformation in the ethics of medical practice and research.
Reformers today seek to further these transformations, expanding our
understandings of the proper scope of medical attention.
Take, for example, a recent article by law professor Zack Buck.150 Buck
explores the concept of “financial toxicity” that has appeared in the medical
literature.151 This concept refers to the phenomenon where individuals who
suffer financial burdens in the course of receiving care have more health
problems and higher mortality rates than those who do not.152 Buck admits
the conceptual barrier between the quality of care and the cost of care may
have been meant to serve the purpose of ensuring that individuals received
care without rationing.153 But now, he argues “[t]o completely separate ‘cost’
from ‘quality’ seems not only unhelpful, but harmful to the actual quality of
care that is being delivered by the provider.”154 He advocates permitting
medical malpractice suits against providers who do not integrate ideas of
financial toxicity into their healthcare paradigm.
Buck seeks to break down the traditional barrier between medical care
and cost of care. Indeed, the term “financial toxicity,” which appears to have
been coined by doctors, is aimed at collapsing the conceptual difference.
Financial hardship is collapsed into physiological harm.155 Interestingly, Buck

149. Gary Marchant et al., Integrating Social and Ethical Concerns into Regulatory Decision-Making
for Emerging Technologies, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 345, 360 (2010); see also Ellen M. McGee,
Should There Be a Law? Brain Chips: Ethical and Policy Issues, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 81, 92 (2007)
(noting that the FDA “is inadequate to consider the social and policy questions raised by
. . . enhancement devices,” thus requiring new regulatory mechanisms). Notably, internal entities
have commented on this issue even before most academics. See Secretary’s Advisory Committee
on Genetic Testing, 65 Fed. Reg. 21,094, 21,095 (Apr. 19, 2000) (finding that the FDA fails to
review “the ethical and social implications” of genetic tests and arguing that“[t]he Secretary
should consider the development of a mechanism to ensure the identification, and appropriate
review, of tests that raise major social and ethical concerns”).
150. See generally Isaac D. Buck, The Cost of High Prices: Embedding an Ethic of Expense into the
Standard of Care, 58 B.C. L. REV. 101 (2017).
151. Id. at 103.
152. Id. at 108.
153. Id. at 141.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 108 (noting that “patients who are saddled with exorbitant medical costs actually
experience worse health outcomes as a result of the cost of their care—suggest[ing] that treating
a patient with an expensive pharmaceutical drug is not just bad for Medicare or the patient’s
financial wellbeing, but it may be bad for the patient’s health as well”).
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notes in passing: “If one can make the argument that choosing expensive
drugs subjects the patient to untenable side effects (based upon the effect of
the care on one’s financial wellbeing, and therefore, one’s physical health),
then doctors have a duty to the patient” to avoid them where possible.156 I
would argue that the drug regulatory apparatus has a similar role.
Buck’s argument is of a similar cloth to a broader literature on what’s
called “social determinants of health.” These are “the structural determinants
and conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age.” They
include socioeconomic status, race, education, environment, employment,
social support networks, access to health care, and the like.157 On that
account, drugs’ effects on a multitude of contexts affect individuals’ health,
and (indirectly, one might say) their bodily functioning. Thus, scholars have,
in some contexts, called for “health impact assessments,” that, much like
environmental impact tools, will calculate the downstream effects of a
particular action on health.158
Similar arguments could be made about concerns regarding the sexual
activity of minors and the race-stigma effects of BiDil. Sexual activity might
produce a range of health-related effects that the FDA is well-equipped to
consider. As the Tummino court noted, at multiple stages of the process, FDA
staff reviewed data about adolescent usage of Plan B, which demonstrated that
there was “neither an increase in risky behaviors nor . . . in appropriate use”
among adolescents.159 Similarly, in the case of BiDil, well-established evidence
shows that social stigma and discrimination, results in negative health
outcomes—both because of the minority stress caused by stigma in a range of
contexts, and a fear of discrimination in accessing healthcare, which deters
healthcare uptake.160 Thus, in both cases, the FDA would have had
appropriate health related-reasons to take into account these considerations.
So much for the malleability of medical understandings. However, there
is a second reason for the FDA to take into account blatantly political, or
156. Id.
157. See Samantha Artiga & Elizabeth Hinton, Beyond Health Care: The Role of Social
Determinants in Promoting Health and Health Equity, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 10, 2018),
http://kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/beyond-health-care-the-role-of-social-determinantsin-promoting-health-and-health-equity [https://perma.cc/75KW-QD6R].
158. Eileen O’Keefe & Alex Scott-Samuel, Human Rights and Wrongs: Could Health Impact
Assessment Help?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 734, 735–36 (2002). Information about health impact
assessments (“HIAs”) can be found on the World Health Organization website. Health Impact
Assessments, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/hia/en [https://perma.cc/U7UQ3NHB]; see also R. QUIGLEY ET AL., HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT: INTERNATIONAL BEST PRINCIPLES,
1–3 (2006) (summarizing health impact assessments).
159. Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
160. The vast literature on minority stress finds that “stressors such as homophobia are
associated with greater physical and mental health problems.” Michael P. Dentato, The Minority
Stress Perspective, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Apr. 2012), https://www.apa.org/pi/aids/resources/
exchange/2012/04/minority-stress [https://perma.cc/7GE4-HNQ5]. The literature is too vast
to cite here.
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purely economic considerations even if there is no plausible case that they are
related to the field of health—it is an executive agency. It therefore has shared
normative allegiances. As a medical entity, it owes allegiance to the norms of
medical practice and research. As a political entity, it is required to follow the
prescriptions that apply to those entities as well. As the next Part details, the
norms of such administrative agencies suggest that such effects be considered.
V.

THE POLICY CASE FOR CONSIDERING ‘OTHER’ SIDE-EFFECTS

The last Part looked at the ethical strictures that come with each of the
kinds of the side-effects this Article alludes to and argues that ethical norms
suggest considering them. This Part now turns to the policy, legal, and
administrative advisability of considering such side-effects in general. It argues
that overall, considering such effects validates policy, transparency, and
information gathering values, and that objections are limited. And indeed, in
some specific instances, specific objections to considering a particular effect
might be offered as part of the systematic, methodical, rational approach to
considering these effects that I am advocating.161
A. CONSEQUENTIALISM
Scholarship, case law, and regulatory approaches in the administrative
law field overwhelmingly advocate for consequentialist reasoning, in
particular, cost-benefit analysis, as a necessary guide to agency
decisionmaking.162 Such consequentialist reasoning undergirds much
administrative decisionmaking. Embedded within this logic is the need to
consider ancillary harms and benefits—whether indirect, third-party, or even
non-health.
Even as agencies seek to produce certain desired effects through their
regulation, the regulation’s benefits are offset by unintended, so-called
ancillary, effects which produce costs. But “‘[t]unnel vision’ within agencies
prevents them from considering ancillary effects altogether—both positive
and negative.”163
As scholars and judges explain, the logic of consequentialism and,
relatedly, CBA, means that an intervention whose ancillary costs are heavy

161. For example, in some cases, the FDA might note that it would step on the toes of other
agencies and refuse to regulate a certain effect. Such conflict has occurred in the past. See, e.g.,
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/domestic-mous/mou-225-71-8003 [https://
perma.cc/EC86-2MZ6]. Preventing conflict with another agency’s jurisdiction, however, would
be a rational basis to refuse to consider any of the effects I outline here. My concern is that the
rationale be systematic and comprehensible.
162. See generally RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008)
(recommending cost benefit analysis).
163. Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 117, at 1767.

A4_KONNOTH (DO NOT DELETE)

208

11/11/2019 4:46 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:171

enough should not be made even if it achieves the desired goal.164 As the OMB
has instructed in its Circular A-4 that lays out the optimum approach to CBA:
Your analysis should look beyond the direct benefits and direct costs
of your rulemaking and consider any important ancillary benefits
and countervailing risks. An ancillary benefit is a favorable impact of
the rule that is typically unrelated or secondary to the statutory
purpose of the rulemaking . . . while a countervailing risk is an
adverse economic, health, safety, or environmental consequence
that occurs due to a rule and is not already accounted for in the
direct cost of the rule.165
The FDA often escapes criticism in this literature—in some ways it is the
original and most dedicated assessor of such ancillary costs because of its
consideration of drug side-effects.166 Indeed, Samuel Rascoff and Ricky
Revesz, in their important article on ancillary effects, explicitly use the term
“side effects” to refer to ancillary costs—unconsciously, perhaps, evoking the
term so common to FDA assessment.167 Yet, it would appear that the FDA’s
approach isn’t perfect. Under the utilitarian rationale of CBA, there is no
justification for discounting indirect, third-party, or non-health harms.
Indeed, although the literature generally does not attempt categorization
of ancillary risk, the fact is that consideration of indirect, third-party, or nonfield specific harms are very much part of regular CBA analysis. One
prominent example is that of “health-health” risk.168 When agencies
implement regulations seeking to improve health, they often impose costs.
Imposing costs might reduce wealth. And according to many scholars,
reducing wealth can reduce health because wealth and health are interreliant. Indeed, one scholar argues that $7.25 million in regulatory costs in
1980 dollars may cause one statistical fatality, a figure that appears in various
judicial opinions.169
Wealth’s effects on health are at best indirect and often of a third-party
nature. For example, Judge Williams of the D.C. Circuit noted in an important
164. Rascoff & Revesz canvas the literature in some detail. See id. at 1781–89.
165. Letter from the Office of Mgmt. & Budget to the Heads of Exec. Agencies &
Establishments, Circular A-4: Regulatory Analysis 26 (Sep. 17, 2003), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP2T-BRAK].
166. Id. With the exception of Rascoff & Revesz, who argue that the FDA does not consider the
ancillary benefits of drugs as well as unintended costs. Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 117, at 1803.
167. Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 117, at 1803.
168. Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1533–38 (1996). As
Rascoff & Revesz explain, these are situations where “the chains of events mediating between
regulatory intervention and ancillary harm take a distinctive form—namely a reduction in overall
social wealth, which is thought to lead to a reduction in overall social health. Proponents of this
methodology begin with the premise that wealthier people and societies are also healthier.” In
other words, these are indirect effects. Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 117, at 1778.
169. Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 147,
154–55 (1990).
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opinion that workplace safety regulation can cause “some combination of
reduced value of firms, higher product prices, fewer jobs in the regulated
industry, and lower cash wages.”170 This, in turn, he noted, citing the $7.25
million figure, could cause a loss of life.171 Thus, regulation protecting
workers in a certain context indirectly harms third parties in the regulated
industry.
This kind of reasoning appears in prominent case law and in regulatory
contexts. Other important jurists have made similar references as Judge
Williams, often explicitly citing the $7.25 million figure. Justice Breyer does
so in his book on risk regulation and in an important administrative law
opinion,172 as do Judges Easterbrook,173 and Posner.174
Perhaps the “most well-known” example in the regulatory context is
OIRA’s decision to stop the review of over 600 workplace contaminants in
1992.175 As its letter to the agency announcing its decision explained, citing
Judge Williams’s then recently issued opinion, “[i]f government regulations
force firms out of business or into overseas production, employment of
American workers will be reduced, making workers less healthy by reducing
their incomes.”176 However, as I discuss further below, in this case, the
agency’s chain of causal connections went too far; Congress faulted the
agency’s approach, and the review proceeded.
Consideration of indirect and third-party effects appears even when there
is no relationship between wealth and health to be drawn. In Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA, the Fifth Circuit struck down an EPA rule that sought to reduce
asbestos exposure.177 The court reasoned that the EPA failed to take into
account the fact that the likely substitutes for asbestos would themselves be
carcinogenic, producing or increasing the same risk it sought to extinguish:
“Eager to douse the dangers of asbestos, the agency inadvertently actually may
increase the risk of injury Americans face. The EPA’s explicit failure to
170. UAW v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 938 F.2d 1310, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Williams, J., concurring).
171. Id.
172. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 490–96 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 14 (1993).
173. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 918 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that because “[t]he net effect of lower income and less
medical care could be a reduction in infants’ prospects,” infants might face more risk if women
were prevented from accessing jobs in which they faced lead exposure, than if they were allowed
to work those jobs), rev’d, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
174. See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 826 (7th Cir. 1993) (arguing that because
OSHA failed to take into account the increased costs to consumers from workplace health
precautions to prevent AIDS transmissions, it overestimated how many lives were saved by the
regulation).
175. See Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 117, at 1786–87.
176. 138 CONG. REC. S3809 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1992) (statement of Sen. Glenn).
177. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991).
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consider the toxicity of likely substitutes thus deprives its order of a reasonable
basis.”178
Similarly, in Competitive Enterprise Institute v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, plaintiffs challenged a fuel standards regulation.179 Plaintiffs
argued that the standards would increase the price of larger, safer cars. This,
in turn, meant that more consumers would drive their older, less safe cars, or
buy smaller, less safe cars.180 “By making it harder for consumers to buy large
cars, the 27.5 mpg standard will increase traffic fatalities if, as a general
matter, small cars are less safe than big ones. They are, as [the agency] itself
acknowledges.”181
Notably, in making its calculation, the court mandated that the agency
go beyond the specific subject area delineated by the statute. The regulation
was imposed pursuant to a statute which aimed at achieving “‘the maximum
feasible average fuel economy level[,]’ . . . tak[ing] into account
. . . technological feasibility; economic practicability; [the] effect of other
Federal motor vehicle standards on fuel economy; and the need of the nation
to conserve energy.”182 Even though “safety” is not a listed consideration, the
agency incorporated it as part of its feasibility analysis in most situations, and
the court’s invalidation of the rule depended on safety considerations.
OMB Circular A-4 similarly adopts indirect third-party effects as examples
of ancillary benefits and costs. An example of an ancillary benefit, it notes, is
“reduced refinery emissions due to more stringent fuel economy standards
for light trucks”—assuming that such fuel standards will, because of market
effects, cause a lower demand for petroleum products.183 Similarly, its
example of an ancillary cost is the same as the CEI case—“adverse safety
impacts from more stringent fuel-economy standards for light trucks.”184
The consequentialist logic of agency review and CBA therefore supports
consideration of indirect, third-party, non-field specific considerations. It is

178. Id. at 1221.
179. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (CEI II), 956 F.2d 321,
322–23 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
180. See Robert W. Crandall, Policy Watch: Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 6 J. ECON.
PERSP. 171, 178 (1992) (explaining how stringent CAFE standards can lead to decreased
automobile safety); Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on
Automobile Safety, 32 J.L. & ECON. 97, 101–15 (1989) (finding that NHTSA’s CAFE standard kills
thousands of people per year). Judge Williams’s opinion cites the study by Crandall and Graham.
See CEI II, 956 F.2d at 327.
181. CEI II, 956 F.2d at 326.
182. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (CEI I), 901 F.2d 107,
114 (1990) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2002(a)(4), (e) (1988) (listing the factors) (repealed 1994));
15 U.S.C. § 2002(a)(4) (granting Secretary of Transportation discretion to amend CAFE
standard); 49 C.F.R. § 1.50(f) (2009) (delegating authority to NHTSA).
183. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 165, at 26.
184. Id.
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somewhat ironic that the agency which has made the most consistent efforts
to consider ancillary costs fails to do so in a way that embraces it fully.
B. ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY
The debates over BiDil and reproductive drugs show that agencies will
sometimes take into account concerns that are never explicitly discussed in
the decisionmaking process. This approach presents numerous concerns.185
Scholars and judges alike openly acknowledge the influence of politics in
the administrative system. As Chevron v. NRDC, among the most cited
administrative law cases,186 notes: “an agency to which Congress has delegated
policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to
inform its judgments.”187 Indeed, then-Professor Elena Kagan argued that it
was desirable for political concerns to be taken into account—what’s the point
of a democracy, she asks, if elections do not change the outcomes of agency
practice.188 If Bush’s policies on reproductive issues helped get him elected,
then surely, that should mean something for FDA practice.189 But even if one
does not agree with Kagan,190 the fact remains that judges and scholars alike
recognize that political forces often influence agency decisionmaking.
As administrative scholar Kathryn Watts explains, early twentieth-century
administrative scholarship saw agencies as comprised of experts that made
decisions based purely on science.191 By the 1980s, this and other models had
given way to a “political control model.”192 Most scholars, including Kagan,
placed the locus of political control with the President, pointing to the
creation of entities like the Office of Management and Budget that solidified
presidential oversight of administrative processes.193 Other scholars, however,
emphasize the ways in which Congress uses formal and informal means to

185. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental
Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1186–87 (2014).
186. Chris Walker, Most Cited Supreme Court Administrative Law Decisions, 36 YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 9, 2014), http://yalejreg.com/nc/most-cited-supreme-courtadministrative-law-decisions-by-chris-walker [https://perma.cc/C9HR-9TVC].
187. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
188. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2378 (2001).
189. See id.
190. Lars Noah, for example, does not think the FDA should take into account these
considerations. See Noah, supra note 80, at 590–94. Another argument is that giving the FDA the
ability to consider extraneous considerations will allow it to look over the crowd and pick out its
friends before coming to a decision. But the evidence above suggests that the FDA does it
anyway—without disclosing who those friends are.
191. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119
YALE L.J. 2, 33 (2009).
192. Id. at 35.
193. Kagan, supra note 188, at 2247–48.
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guide agency decisionmaking, including hearings, funding decisions,
investigations, and informal contacts.194
Despite this general understanding, agency decisionmaking records are
generally devoid of such information. In the FDA context, this means that the
agency’s documented advisory committee and other processes explicitly
consider only certain data, while sidestepping the actual animating force
behind its decision. Watts lays out numerous such examples, some pertaining
to the FDA. For example, when the FDA sought to regulate teen smoking in
the 1990s, President Clinton intervened heavily in the rulemaking—even
announcing the final rule in a Rose Garden ceremony. But the FDA’s
regulatory material such as its statement of basis and purpose squarely relied
on statutory citations and expert data. Presidential policy was eclipsed.195
Decisions regarding HIV drugs, among others, were similarly politically
influenced.196
The attempt of both the Bush and the Obama administrations to stymie
OTC approval of Plan B, however, presents a more recent example of such
behavior. As a short-term issue, it prevents us from holding the FDA
accountable for political decisions. As a longer-term issue, it saps the morale
within the agency, and the legitimacy of the agency’s scientific reasoning
itself.
First, consider accountability concerns. In the Plan B context, political
reasoning permeated the process. The Bush administration had gone out of
the usual process to appoint individuals “active in the Right to Life
antiabortion world” to the advisory committee, and sought to pacify
“constituents who would be very unhappy with . . . an over-the-counter Plan
B.”197 The administration sought to send a “message that we were taking
adolescents and reproductive issues seriously.”198 Similarly, President Obama
publicly endorsed Sebelius’s decision—which the court suggested “was an
election-year decision that ‘many public health experts saw as a politically
motivated effort to avoid riling religious groups and others opposed to
making birth control available to girls.’”199
Frustratingly, instead of acknowledging these concerns openly, the FDA
hid behind science. During the Bush administration, senior FDA personnel
repeatedly claimed that non-approval of OTC status was based on “a lack of

194. Watts, supra note 191, at 36–37.
195. Id. at 23–24.
196. See generally DAVID FRANCE, HOW TO SURVIVE A PLAGUE: THE STORY OF HOW ACTIVISTS
AND SCIENTISTS TAMED AIDS (2016) (highlighting the spread of AIDS in the US, the public
response to the disease and the politics involved with combating the disease).
197. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 528–29 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
198. Id. at 529 (citation omitted).
199. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). As some academics
pithily put it, “Plan B is more dangerous to politicians than to adolescent girls.” Alastair J.J. Wood
et al., The Politics of Emergency Contraception, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 102 (2012).

A4_KONNOTH (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/11/2019 4:46 PM

DRUGS’ OTHER SIDE-EFFECTS

213

adequate data to support appropriate use of Plan B by adolescents under 16”
despite receiving evidence from their staff on numerous occasions showing
that the risk was minimal.200 In its 2004 refusal, the administration therefore
cited an “inadequate sampling of younger age groups.”201 Similarly, under the
Obama administration, even though the FDA Commissioner sought to
approve the drug, the Secretary of HHS, Kathleen Sebelius took the
extraordinary step of overruling the Commissioner’s determination because,
she claimed, “the data submitted for this product do not establish that
prescription dispensing requirements should be eliminated for all ages.”202
The district court took apart Sebelius’s reasoning sentence by sentence, in a
harshly worded opinion.203 Similarly, “the FDA . . . pursued a litigation
strategy dependent on the assertion of the deliberative process privilege to
prevent plaintiffs from obtaining conclusive evidence as to the merits of its
claim.”204
Now, it may be important to us as a society to express the “message that
we were taking adolescents and reproductive issues seriously.”205 But that is a
debate that the FDA should have had openly—as many members of Congress
were happy to.206 But instead, because the reasons offered were scientific,
there was no way to actually have the debate. As one FDA staff member
noted—if data on sexual activity was the problem, and “if this is not enough
data upon which to base a decision, it is unclear what could constitute enough
data or even if that is a[n] obtainable goal.”207
This approach prevents us from holding agencies—and the courts that
review them—accountable for their decisions. As Kathryn Watts explains,
avoiding a discussion of non-physiological, moral considerations “creates a
type of monitoring gap: an agency’s scientific and technocratic reasoning can
be closely monitored, whereas political influences directed toward agencies
by Congress or the President will not be publicly disclosed and thus will not
be subject to the same type of monitoring and accountability.”208 We are

200. Even before the advisory committee meeting in 2003, when the application was first
filed, staff proffered evidence that there would be no increased sexual activity. Torti, 603 F. Supp.
2d at 530. After the meeting, staff provided such evidence on numerous occasions over the course
of 2004. Id. at 531–32.
201. Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
202. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 167–68.
204. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
205. Id. at 529 (citation omitted).
206. Senators Hillary Clinton and Patty Murray put a hold on the confirmation of an FDA
Commissioner till they received assurances that the OTC switch would be approved; senators
vowed to block the confirmation of the next Commissioner for similar reasons. Id. at 534. As a
result of all of this, numerous legislators successfully sought a GAO report that reported that the
FDA’s behavior was highly unusual. Id. at 537.
207. Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
208. Watts, supra note 191, at 43.
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unable to seek accountability from political actors for their behavior in such
contexts.209 Further, courts that review these agencies can themselves hide
their policy preferences behind the cloak of technocratic expertise like the
agency.210 If the agency explicitly embraces policy, it is harder for a court itself
to engage in such dissembling.
This kind of behavior harms agencies in long-term ways as well. It saps
the morale of agency actors. It is one thing to be told that a particular decision
is being made based on policy and is above your paygrade.211 It is quite
another to have one’s bosses make claims, purportedly based on science,
which flagrantly discount the work of, and data collected by, FDA staff. The
staff was asked to complete their review even though they were informed that
the decision had already been made.212 Their work becomes “merely window
dressing.”213 This caused “dismay”214 among the staff, prompted high profile
resignations and sapped morale.
Further, the scientific expertise of the agency itself becomes politicized.
Allowing “agencies to disclose political factors could help to take some of the
political pressure off of science, creating a more effective separation between
science and politics.”215 But politicizing science to support policy conclusions
that the science does not itself point to sullies the value of science. As scholars
at a National Academies of Science Workshop noted:
Politicians bring science and scientists into the policy arena in an
effort to say “the science is on my side.” However, . . . leverage[ing]
. . . the public’s historical trust in scientists, to move political agendas
forward . . . [could mean that the] public, which generally has an
unfavorable view of politicians, can extend its negative feelings
toward science . . . .216

209. If democratic accountability means anything, administrative judgments, whether based
on values or something else, require explicit and open consideration. As Livermore and Revesz
note in CBA, “[t]he unacknowledged consideration of a factor . . . has obvious negative
consequences for . . . transparency [and] accountability . . . . [Reason-giving, they note,] is . . .
‘central to U.S. administrative law and practice’ . . . .” Michael A. Livermore & Richard L.
Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1233 (2014).
Theories of agency legitimacy, accountability (to Congress, the judiciary, and even internally to
other administrative entities), and deliberative democracy, promote transparency in government
reasoning. Id.
210. Watts, supra note 191, at 78.
211. As former Deputy Solicitor General under then-Attorney General Kamala Harris, who,
as an elected official, had a mandate from the people, this was an experience the author regularly
encountered.
212. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
213. Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d, 212, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
214. Id.
215. Watts, supra note 191, at 40.
216. NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE AT THE INTERFACES OF THE
LIFE SCIENCES AND SOCIETY: DOES THE PUBLIC TRUST SCIENCE? 22 (2015).
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There are circumstances in which taking non-health related concerns
into account would be problematic. First, a statute might restrict the FDA’s
ability to take into account non-health considerations in certain
circumstances. As I argue below, when it comes to whether to approve a drug,
the FDA’s discretion is more limited. However, it has more discretion when it
comes to putting together risk management strategies. Second, Watts argues
that political and policy influences must be “openly and transparently
disclosed” to promote accountability.217
Third, decisions must be supported by some kind of policy position
rather than simple political expediency. Take one example: The Bush
administration, as a policy matter, sought to discourage contraceptive access,
and promote abstinence. It ran, and won, two elections on this platform.218
Accordingly, it would be rational for its agencies to consistently support these
policies. On the flipside, the Obama administration took a diametrically
distinct approach to contraceptive access. Its decision, which undermined its
policy positions, was based on crass election year calculations, and is harder
to justify (even though, on the whole, my policy preferences align far more
with Obama than Bush). Other unacceptable examples might include making
decisions solely to satisfy political donors, or simply for partisan reasons. While
agencies could “spin[] . . . raw political decisions as . . . policy choices,” the
FDA would still be disclosing most of its political influences, permitting more
accountability than there is today.219
C. INFORMATION
Where there is no open debate, there is also a limited likelihood that the
agency has fully investigated and weighed the evidence. This means that the
agency will sometimes act based on intuitions rather than on full information
where evidence can be adduced and weighed.
Cass Sunstein argues that reason-giving can improve the quality of agency
decisionmaking directly by forcing agencies to examine issues in which they
have limited expertise.220 The examples I have offered provide strong support
for his claim.
Take the example of Plan B. FDA decisionmakers, as I note above, feared
what is effectively risk-compensation behavior. They worried that teens would
engage in more frequent intercourse which presents both public health, and

217. Watts, supra note 191, at 8.
218. Cynthia Dailard, New Bush Administration Policy Promotes Abstinence Until Marriage Among
People in Their 20s, 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 23, 23 (2006).
219. Watts, supra note 191, at 56.
220. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1091
(2000) (discussing these arguments in favor of reason-giving).
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for some, moral, concerns.221 Evidence existed to refute those claims.222 But
there was little room in the FDA decisionmaking process to evaluate and rebut
those concerns on the record.
The BiDil approval presented similar concerns. The FDA could have
chosen to approve BiDil, but could have encouraged, commissioned, or
conducted studies on racialized drugs. Did the availability of such drugs
change how doctors saw race in medicine? Did policymakers shift their focus
from structural racism to racialized medicine as some feared? The answer,
with the benefit of a decade of hindsight, seems no, because BiDil did not
have much of an effect on the market. But these are valid questions should
similarly focused medications appear again.
Other sociological and value-based concerns abound with drug approval.
For example, one study notes that for some women, Viagra increases their
sense of gender inequity: “[M]en have even more power than they did
before.”223 But it is far from clear even from this study whether this is a oneoff reaction, or whether this is a broader concern. Should this prove to be a
major concern, the FDA might, for example, require that doctors offer
counseling to men on gender equity issues before prescribing the drug.
D. OBJECTIONS
1. Time and Cost
The FDA approval process, many argue, is slow and expensive. Slowing
down the process even more will cost more money and time. However, I
believe that approvers should take into account the cost of the delay—and, as
I explain below, I would be satisfied with an approve-and-study approach in
most circumstances as a default.224 Under this approach, there would be no
need to pause or delay approvals because of burdens that are non-health
related or speculative. But where the harms seem clear, even without much
further examination, and higher than the benefits, such as those flowing from
high cost drugs across the health system, the FDA should be given the

221. See supra notes 86–87.
222. Marc Kaufman, Morning-After Pill Study Contradicts Claim by Foes: Easy Access Did Not Lead
to Riskier Behavior, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2005, at A9.
223. Annie Potts et al., The Downside of Viagra: Women’s Experiences and Concerns, 25 SOC.
HEALTH & ILLNESS 697, 712 (2003).
224. Sunstein, supra note 168, at 1553, breaks down the facts:
First is the cost of delay, understood as the cost of not controlling the regulated risk
until more information has been compiled. . . . Second is the cost of investigating the
ancillary risk . . . . Third is the benefit of investigating the ancillary risk . . . . Under
this view, it is of course (and unfortunately) important to know at least something
about the possible extent of the ancillary risk and the costs of discovering it.
However, Sunstein concludes—correctly, I think—that such a common-sense assessment is quite
possible.
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authority to hold up approval, even when the effects go beyond the
physiological effects on those receiving the medication.
Further, assuming that society has to avert, compensate, or otherwise
absorb the harm, the question is not whether to address the harm, but when
and where to address it. While the approval process might have its issues, it
might prove to be the proverbial stitch in time that saves downstream sewing.
Discussions about regulation have frequently addressed the choice
between ex post and ex ante regulation. Ex ante regulation refers to
interventions made before the harm that is sought to be averted; ex post to
interventions made after. Recently, Brian Galle has challenged defenders of
ex post regulation, arguing that sometimes ex ante regulation served useful
purposes.225
Both ex ante and ex post approaches can vary in timing. For example,
consider ex ante prevention of drug injury. Within the FDA process, to
prevent an injury resulting from a particular side-effect of a drug, one could
intervene before the application is submitted, after the application is
approved but just up to the point of the occurrence of the injury: We might
provide a blood thinner just before administering medication known to risk
blood clots.226 Tort liability or fines are a set of interventions that take place
after the injury.
Galle and his interlocutors present a pros/cons list of ex ante and ex post
regulation that can be generalized along a timeline continuum. The earlier
the regulation, the less information one has. It is hard to customize the
intervention to the expected for harm or set the deterrent appropriately.227
But ex post regulation can under-deter because of cognitive biases
—individuals discount future harms, including punishment and penalties.228
It might also fail to compensate because of judgment proof defendants or
other issues, which Galle refers to liquidity problems.229
In the drug context, later interventions might also come with a set of
unique costs. The first is opportunity cost. The later an intervention that may
stop work on a particular drug, the greater the net opportunity loss to society
that could have focused its resources elsewhere. Second, and relatedly, there
is the problem of deterioration. The longer one waits, the worse a problem
225. See generally Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715 (2015)
(arguing against the developing consensus in favor of ex post incentives).
226. Common Test Shows Blood Clot Risk for Cancer Patients Getting Chemo, U. ROCHESTER MED.
CTR. (Dec. 5, 2005), https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/news/story/953/common-test-showsblood-clot-risk-for-cancer-patients-getting-chemo.aspx [https://perma.cc/2N2D-NFYP].
227. As Galle explains, in most cases, each additional unit of negative externality reduction
is costlier to achieve. Further, each unit produces fewer benefits to society. Thus, because the
“government will lack full information” for this analysis, many commentators argue that “ex post
regulations will often be preferable to ex ante solutions.” Galle, supra note 225, at 1725.
228. Id. at 1721 (noting that myopic failure to take into account future harms or costs is far
too common).
229. Id. at 1738–43.
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can become. Without intervention, a problem can affect more people, or
morph into other problems. Thus, antibiotic resistance might grow if PrEP
proves to have risk compensation effects. Similarly, healthcare costs might
increase as long as the Hepatitis C drug remains on the market.
Where possible, then, it might be better to intervene earlier on in the
process precisely to prevent downstream harms where information can be
collected with minimal cost. In other countries, for example, pricing
information is demanded before effective approval.230 Adopting the same
approach here might save on increased opportunity costs sunk into drug
review and approval.
2. The Kitchen Sink/Overreach Objection
Another concern is that there is no end to the approach I suggest. The
agency that is supposed to regulate the toe bone will end up passing judgment
on the neck bone; the blacksmith who shoes the horse will decide the fate of
the kingdom.231 Having the FDA regulate beyond its bailiwick by taking into
account an infinite causal thread will make it master of all, with harmful
effects on liberty interests.
Nonetheless, other agencies have been able to cogently take into account
follow-on effects without such disastrous results. I suggest nothing that
administrators do not already often do, even though the statutory or
regulatory language might be slightly different in each case. Thus, the OMB
Circular suggests considering “important” ancillary benefits and costs.232
Congressional approaches to the question have appeared to have adopted a
“reasonableness” or “identifiability” standard—agencies should consider any
effect that they can identify in a reasonable way.233 Academics, similarly, have
avoided drawing any bright lines, recognizing the need for flexibility. For
example, acknowledging the myriad costs and benefits that agencies could
take into account, Sunstein merely cautions that “the agency should avoid
double counting; the benefits must be genuinely attributable to the rule in

230. Admittedly, in many of these nations, the review is linked to nationalized medical
systems. See Suzanne Elvidge, UK Government to Tackle High Drug Prices, PHARM. J. (Sept. 20, 2016),
https://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/news-and-analysis/news/uk-government-to-tackle-highdrug-prices/20201736.article?firstPass=false [https://perma.cc/5D78-72VK].
231. For Want of a Nail, ALL NURSERY RHYMES, https://allnurseryrhymes.com/for-want-of-anail [https://perma.cc/4KZN-256V].
232. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 165.
233. For example, the Clean Air Act requires that certain air standards “shall accurately reflect
the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on
public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient
air, in varying quantities.” 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (2012). The one outlying bill is the Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1999, which defines substitution risk as “a reasonably identifiable significant
increased risk to health, safety, or the environment expected to result from a regulatory option;
and [that does] not include risks attributable to the effect of an option on the income of
individuals.” Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 746, 106th Cong. § 621(11)(A)–(B).
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question, and they must not be counted more than once in the analyses that
accompany more than one rule.”234
Nonetheless, even if we figure out where to draw the line, some argue
that expanding the FDA’s reach to include value judgments will harm liberty
interests.235 But to my mind, the liberty interests cut in both directions. The
FDA, like other agencies, will regulate based on values. It would be foolhardy
to try and “suppress” value-based instincts “out of the administrative
process.”236 It better respects liberty interests to engage with this kind of
reasoning openly and frankly. Further, the calibration approach described in
the next Part will address some liberty concerns—when it comes to decisions
far afield from agency competence, which include those which are intimate
to an individual’s personhood, the statutory structure suggests (and the
Constitution probably mandates) that the reach of agency regulation cannot
place an undue burden on the individual.
To be sure, sometimes an agency can go too far. OIRA’s decision to
suspend the review of workplace safety regulation based on decreased
incomes was done without any notice or analysis. It had failed to engage in
the kind of evidence determination that some felt was necessary. As Senator
Ted Kennedy argued, all it had relied on was “a far-out, off-the-wall, right-wing
theory . . . that if employers spend less money on health and safety, they will
pay higher wages to employees or charge lower prices for their goods.”237
Rather than provide further analysis, however, OIRA simply backed down and
let the regulatory review proceed. Had context specific evidence developed
through a deliberative decisionmaking process been adduced, however, the
reaction and outcome may have been quite different.
3. Expertise
The next objection is that the FDA lacks the expertise to carry out the
tasks I suggest.238 However, the statute allows the FDA to obtain expertise as
required, a feature it demonstrates regularly in the antibiotic resistance
context.239 The FDA works collaboratively with several agencies and advisory
groups in making its decisions. Although creating advisory committees are
234. Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions (and Almost as
Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 190 n.92 (2014); see also Saul, supra note 94.
235. Lamkin, supra note 141, at 565.
236. David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611,
620 (2012).
237. National Cooperative Research Act Extension, 138 CONG. REC. S3841, S3859 (Sep. 27,
1992) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
238. Some may argue that another agency should form to carry out this task such as the
Centers for Disease Control, or even professional associations. While I do not deny that as a
possibility, the genesis for this Article is that the FDA has been engaging in these activities quite
frequently—just not methodically.
239. See Zettler et al., supra note 15, at 250–51 (noting a role for advisory committees to
advise on public health issues).
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limited under the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972,240 in the FDA
context, the Secretary appears to have broad discretion to “(1) establish such
technical and scientific review groups as are needed to carry out the functions
of the Food and Drug Administration . . . and (2) appoint and pay the
members of such groups.”241 She also has the ability to contract for expert
review and is required to collaborate with other agencies on many issues.242
Although the Secretary is more constrained with respect to whom she can
appoint to some committees,243 with most—especially the ones pertaining to
drug application, withdrawal, and advertising—she has great discretion. She
therefore can appoint individuals who would be cognizant of harms broader
than mere physiological harms, ranging from concerns related to
marginalization and health costs.
“For the purpose of providing expert scientific advice . . . regarding
. . . the approval for marketing of a drug . . . the Secretary shall establish
panels of experts.”244 Similar panels exist for classifying devices, for example,
as needing pre-market approval.245 The Secretary has discretion to appoint
members with appropriate qualifications, including those “qualified by
training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the device
. . . .”246 In some cases, the Commissioner must refer an opioid application to
a committee unless she finds, inter alia, that such a referral “is not in the
interest of protecting and promoting public health.”247 “[The] FDA generally
follows an advisory committee’s recommendation, but is not bound to do
so.”248
The statute to some extent requires that the FDA rely on advisory
committees for continued assessment of the risks that new drugs pose, review
that may ultimately lead to withdrawal. “At least biannually, the Secretary shall
seek recommendations from the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory
Committee” on assessing drug safety in the field.249 The Secretary must also
act “through” the committee in some cases.250 The Secretary may also convene

240. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
241. 21 U.S.C. §§ 394, 379d–1 (2012).
242. Id. § 397(a) (contracts for expert review); id. § 355e(b)(4) (enforcement); id. § 356(c)
(decrease in lifesaving drugs; collaboration with DOJ).
243. However, the manufacturing requirements committee has nine members and is more
restrictive. Id. § 360j(f)(3).
244. Id. § 355(n)(1).
245. Id. § 360c(b).
246. Id. § 360c(b)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(1) (2018).
247. Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-198,
§ 106(a)(1)(B)(i), 130 Stat. 695, 702.
248. Human Drug Advisory Committees, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/
CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs [https://perma.cc/9G5S-QR5B] (last updated Oct. 5, 2017).
249. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(4)(C).
250. Id. § 355-1(f)(5).

A4_KONNOTH (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/11/2019 4:46 PM

DRUGS’ OTHER SIDE-EFFECTS

221

meetings to review safety concerns and the risk mitigation strategy involving a
drug.251
The FDA also takes input from other entities in reviewing
communication and advertising. The Advisory Committee on Risk
Communication acts to “advise the Commissioner on methods to effectively
communicate risks associated with the products regulated by the Food and
Drug Administration.”252 The Secretary has latitude to determine who is
appointed to the committee. She also has the authority to go beyond the
committee.253 In reviewing “scientific evidence and research on
decisionmaking and social and cognitive psychology” the Secretary must
“consult with drug manufacturers, clinicians, patients and consumers, experts
in health literacy, representatives of racial and ethnic minorities, and experts
in women’s and pediatric health.”254 In other words, the Secretary has the
authority to ensure that each committee has members that are experts on the
effects of these various drugs that extend beyond the physiological effects of
drugs.
The FDA should continue working with and soliciting the opinion of
state health entities, expand communication with formulary committees of
large entities, as well as other stakeholders to determine best practices. It
should also take advantage of the consultative benefits available to all
agencies.255
4. Federalism
Should states have a role in this process? Most scholars involved in the
debates over federalism in the drug regulation process agree that when the
FDA has considered the harms of a drug, and decided to take or withhold

251. Id. § 355-1(h)(5).
252. Id. § 360bbb-6(a)(2).
253. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3507, 124 Stat. 119,
530 (2010).
254. Id. Further, outside entities help establish “innovative, collaborative projects in research,
education, and outreach for the purpose of fostering medical product innovation, enabling the
acceleration of medical product development.” 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb–5.
255. Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VS. RISK:
TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 251 (1995), for example, suggest that
OIRA develop greater expertise in these kind of risk assessments. Beyond that, they suggest a
“primary care” agency, possibly in the White House, which could then holistically treat a
regulatory problem, analyzing risks that that more narrowly focused agencies would miss. The
primary care agency would refer specific risks to “specialist” agencies as needed. Alternatively, a
complex agency could place oversight of risk into a position entitled “Undersecretary for Risk
Management.” See id. at 258.
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action, states are generally preempted from counteracting the FDA.256 The
Supreme Court has also weighed in on the question.257
I seek to engage in these debates only in one particular: Allowing the
FDA to take into account other considerations beyond physiological health,
some might say, would encroach into areas traditionally under state control.
Catherine Sharkey, a prolific commentator in these debates, offers the
following hypothetical:
[S]uppose that [Massachusetts] enacted a ban on a painkiller drug
not due to health and safety concerns, but instead because it wanted
to recognize and encourage its citizens’ puritanminded, “buck-up in
the face of pain” mentality. In such a case, the purpose behind the
federal regulations would be different from the state’s motivation
for action, and the FDA ostensibly would not have considered the
state’s (non-health and safety) related purposes when regulating.
When federal and state actors regulate for different purposes, such
that a federal agency is less likely to have considered a state’s
purported interests, the case for preemption is weaker.258
Sharkey’s point is that if the state considers a purpose that the federal
government has not considered, then the state’s action may not be
preempted. My question is—is it legitimate for the federal government take
into account such purposes?
The FDA should only be able to take into account policies which reflect
a broad national consensus.259 Even if the harm at issue concerns only a
particular state—for example, a localized outbreak of some particular
condition—if a national policy exists that determines what the outcome
should be, the FDA should follow that policy. National policies exist on a
range of subjects, ranging from health and safety (preserving lives and
resources is good) to ethical standards on racism.
But where norms are localized, the FDA should refrain; where they are
in flux, they should be warier. Thus, to use Sharkey’s hypothetical, the FDA
should refrain from considering New England puritanism in making
decisions. In short, the FDA should only take into account a harm as it does
now—where there is consensus. Preemption related concerns will arise but

256. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in
Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013, 1013–14 (2007). But see
generally Lars Noah, State Affronts to Federal Primacy in the Licensure of Pharmaceutical Products, 2016
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (explaining the difficulties of the argument); Diana R. H. Winters, The Benefits
of Regulatory Friction in Shaping Policy, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 228 (2016) (explaining why state
regulation has its benefits); Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845 (2017)
(explaining the benefits of state regulation).
257. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558–59 (2009).
258. Catherine M. Sharkey, States Versus FDA, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1609, 1628 n.85 (2015).
259. To be sure, if the cost of identifying whether there is some consensus is onerous, the
FDA could say so, see supra Section V.D.1.
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the exact rule that should be followed in such cases is beyond the scope of
this Article.
VI.

REGULATORY CALIBRATION

How should the FDA take into account these kinds of non-traditional
effects? A full assessment of that question is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, my claim is that given that many of the harms I describe exist on a
continuum, the FDA’s action should also be calibrated to that continuum. In
this Part, I attempt to show merely that the FDA’s organic statute often offers
the possibility of some kind of rough calibration depending on the harm
involved. The action the FDA can take might range in severity, involving
among other things, (1) drug approval; (2) advertising review; and (3) post
approval surveillance and possible withdrawal, among others. The FDA’s
action in dealing with these harms, based on the logic of the statute and other
criteria, should be calibrated based on the directness of the drug’s effect, the
scope of the entities affected, and whether there is a core health concern
involved. It bears noting that the calibration framework is already familiar to
FDA regulation. The statute, for example, requires that REMS “to
assure safe use” which might range simply from labeling, to distribution
restrictions “shall . . . be commensurate with the specific serious risk.”260 My
claim is that broader FDA regulation should conform to a similar approach.
A. DESCRIBING REGULATORY CALIBRATION
Calibrated enforcement has received significant attention in
administrative scholarship. In their highly cited work, Responsive Regulation,
Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite place regulatory action on a so called
“enforcement pyramid.”261 The pyramid describes a “range of interventions
of ever-increasing intrusiveness (matched by ever-decreasing frequency of
use).”262 At the base of the pyramid, we find the least intrusive agency action,
that one expects applied to the greatest number of firms—persuasion, where
the agency informs the firm of the violation and seeks to coax them into
compliance. As one goes up the pyramid, the intrusion escalates to warning
letters, civil, then criminal, penalties, license suspension, and license
revocation—actions that apply to an ever-decreasing number of regulated
entities.263 Scholars have offered other pyramid-like models. Thus, some
scholars argue that the pyramid should be reconceptualized as having more

260.
261.
262.
263.

21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2)(A) (2012).
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 18, at 6.
Id. at 6.
See id. at 35.
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facets, with other social entities, in addition to the government, placing
escalating burdens on firms for non-compliance.264
What might the pyramid look like in the FDA context? The FDA
interventions I list in Part II—approval, advertising and labeling, REMS
requirements, and post market surveillance, are best understood as ranging
in levels of intensity. Three criteria determine the level of intensity: burden,
blanket effect, and timing. The FDA’s actions affect manufacturers, doctors,
patients, indeed, the entire medical system. We might assess the FDA’s
behavior with respect to all of these entities in order to determine the level of
intensity.
The first criterion is severity, measured by the extent of force exercised
on the subject of the regulation to achieve the desired effect. Administrative
scholars point to a range of severity ranging from nudging to coercion.
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have famously advocated for a “nudge”
regime in many contexts, where entities can use techniques to guide
individual choices to help them avoid the cognitive biases individuals exhibit
in making decisions. The extent to which these techniques impose costs on
individuals—and the extent to which they affect decisionmaking—are a
matter of degree.265 In some cases, the effect is unavoidable: How one orders
food in a cafeteria will affect individuals’ dietary choices. Sunstein and Thaler
argue that since some order has to be chosen anyway, choosing the ordering
that produces the best dietary choices is minimally coercive.266
But the coercion lies on a spectrum. For example, one might have
voluntary information release, or compelled information release—Sunstein
and Thaler point to the FDA’s tobacco labeling regulation as an example.267
Default options might involve low-cost, one-click opt-outs—for example,
opting out of data privacy protections on websites. Or the costs of opting out
might be higher—filling out a form for example, to opt out of health
insurance coverage. As Pierre Schlag puts it, “a nudge” can become “a
shove.”268 Further, “[s]omeone’s nudge is someone else’s” coercion—“[o]ne
suspects, for instance, that those who are blacklisted as a result of compelled-

264. Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Integrative Regulation: A Principle-Based Approach to
Environmental Policy, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 853, 855 (1999). Some scholars have also discussed
the article in the context of Food & Drug law. See generally Stuart Hogarth et al., Closing the Gaps
—Enhancing the Regulation of Genetic Tests Using Responsive Regulation, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 831
(2007) (explaining how the current regulatory framework is inadequate). However, in so doing,
they essentially replicate Ayres’s and Braithwaite’s arguments.
265. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 251 (2009). See generally ROBERT BALDWIN, NUDGE: THREE DEGREES OF
CONCERN (2015), https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64049/1/Policy%20Briefing%207_2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ L76B-6WAV] (discussing degrees of nudging).
266. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 265, at 10.
267. Id. at 191.
268. Pierre Schlag, Nudge, Choice Architecture, and Libertarian Paternalism, 108 MICH. L. REV.
913, 917 (2010) (reviewing the above cited book by Thaler & Sunstein).
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disclosure requirements will view the requirements as coercive, not a nudge
at all.”269 But of course, not all shoves are impermissible.
A glance at some of the FDA’s regulatory mechanisms reveals a spectrum
of nudges-into-coercion, and we might look at a variety of criteria to
determine where on the spectrum we are. With respect to manufacturers, we
might assess this criterion by looking at the severity of the penalty the FDA
would impose if the manufacturer were to engage in impermissible behavior.
The FDA might impose heavy damages or imprisonment if the manufacturer
flouted an FDA command, or simply issue an advisory with no further
penalty.270
With respect to doctors and patients, whom the FDA cannot penalize, per
se, severity might be measured in degree of access to the drug. FDA action
that bans the drug wholesale or for certain populations is coercion—it
physically prevents access. FDA action that allows the drug to be administered
but with appropriate advertising or warnings is a form of nudging.
Another criterion involves the reach of the FDA’s action. The FDA might
take blanket action, approving the drug for all individuals or requiring
blanket advertising. In practice, of course, the FDA engages in some degree
of customization at the time of approval, by limiting access based on
condition, and sometimes imposing additional conditions that limit drug
availability and require certain labeling information.271 As a general matter,
though, it does not generally penalize off-label use.272

269. Id.
270. The FDA website, for example, recounts a spectrum of possible penalty. Recalls,
Corrections and Removals (Devices), FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulation
andguidance/postmarketrequirements/recallscorrectionsandremovals/default.htm [https://
perma.cc/PA9X-SFWR]. As the FDA explains, actions might range from “[c]orrection” which
“means repair . . . relabeling . . . or inspection (including patient monitoring) of a product
without its physical removal.” Id. “Market withdrawal” can “mean[] a firm’s removal . . . which
involves a minor violation that would not be subject to legal action by the FDA.” Id. “Recall means
a firm’s removal or correction of a marketed product that the FDA considers to be in violation of
the laws it administers and against which the agency would initiate legal action.” Id. Recalls
themselves are subject to spectra. Thus, “[m]edical device recalls are usually conducted
voluntarily by the manufacturer.” Id. But in serious enough situations, where the manufacturer is
not complying, the “FDA may issue a recall order to the manufacturer.” Id. Other factors include
the “[d]epth of recall. Depending on the product’s degree of hazard and extent of distribution,
the recall strategy will specify the level in the distribution chain to which the recall is to extend.”
Id. Finally, another escalation is “a public warning . . . to alert the public that a product being
recalled presents a serious hazard to health. This is reserved for urgent situations where other
means for preventing use of the recalled product appear inadequate.” Id.
271. Evans, supra note 33, at 512.
272. Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label,” FDA, https://www.fda.gov/
ForPatients/Other/Offlabel/default.htm [https://perma.cc/JHT5-QQZ2]; see also Legal Status
of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and
Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (Aug. 15, 1972) (stating that labeling is not
intended to impede the physician’s exercise of judgment concerning what is best for the patient
or to impose liability for prescribing decisions that are at odds with drug labeling).
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One could imagine a range of other customized approaches that reflect
different degree of coercion/choice alternation/nudging, some which are
not statutorily sanctioned under current law. For example, drugs may be
approved on the condition that manufacturers price discriminate. To prevent
an entire insurance pool from being harmed, those who cost share more can
be asked to pay full price. We might also demand price discrimination based
on the patient’s income, and whether the insurance program is public or
private.
By allowing such discrimination, we might optimize social value. As I
explain above, ensuring that only individuals who do not already use condoms
get PrEP would be optimal.273 Similarly, even if BiDil worked better in some
races than others, we might want to restrict access to a race-based drug to only
those situations where its marginal benefit over the next best alternative is
significant. (BiDil’s manufacturer never had to prove such a benefit). Such an
approach would signal the FDA’s reluctance to endorse racialized medicine
and would alleviate the harms of the drug’s approval. Overall, with medical
improvements, precise customization might become possible.274
Finally, the timing of the FDA’s intervention also affects how intense its
action appears. The withdrawal of a drug is, in some ways, a more severe action
than refusing to approve a drug in the first place. Manufacturers and those
who worked on drug research and development may experience an
endowment effect in knowing that their drug is approved and on the
market.275 More importantly, consumers who might be habituated to certain
drugs or regimens might find withdrawal to be more burdensome. On the
other hand, withdrawing the drug at a later date will ensure that
manufacturers have a chance to recoup at least some of their outlays.
B. JUSTIFYING CALIBRATION
In proposing calibration, Ayres and Braithwaite—and other scholars
since—offer a set of justifications that differ significantly from the ones I offer
here. Their proposal comes from a game theory perspective, focused on the
question of compliance. As they explain, while relying solely on persuasion
“will be exploited when actors are motivated by economic rationality,” relying
“mostly on punishment will undermine the good will of actors . . . [who are]
motivated by a sense of responsibility.”276 Further, “[p]unishment is
expensive; persuasion is cheap.”277 Thus, they argue, it is more efficient to
escalate up the pyramid only when the firm proves itself unwilling to comply
273. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
274. See generally Craig Konnoth, Health Information Equity, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1317 (2017)
(highlighting the rise in health information being collected to tailor medical care to specific
individuals).
275. Craig Konnoth, Revoking Rights, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1365, 1382 (2015).
276. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 18, at 19.
277. Id.
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with more limited interventions. These claims have received expansion,
support and criticism. For example, scholars, perhaps most prominently in
the tax literature—question the efficacy of the model. Starting low and
escalating enforcement often leads to undercompliance, they claim.278
While I too am interested in the question of calibration, it is for very
different reasons. I am not interested in its efficacy in inducing compliance.
Rather, I am interested in agency competency, legitimacy, and legality. This
offers an additional set of arguments to the literature on calibrated
regulation.
The competency-based arguments are fairly straightforward. The FDA
should stay its hand the more indirect, third-party, and non-health-related a
drug’s effects are. Given existing disciplinary boundaries, FDA personnel are
the most likely to have expertise on issues connected with health and,
specifically, physiological effects. Evaluating concerns in other areas might
involve intervening on issues they know little about. Accordingly, in such
areas, advisories or flagging issues for further study would be more apposite
than flat out bans.
Next, even in areas where the FDA has expertise, there is uncertainty. As
effects are further removed from the initial cause, the possibility of other
intervention increases uncertainty.279 Third-party and society wide effects will
mostly (though not always) be intermediated by other factors. Predicting risk
compensation is a fraught exercise, mediated by individual perceptions,
preferences, and circumstances, that will vary greatly across groups. An
approve-and-study approach is likely superior to a ban-and-study approach.
Competency based arguments are connected to legitimacy-based
arguments. Even if the FDA had expertise and could make sound predictions,
in a world with disciplinary boundaries, any overreach could, as a practical
matter, sap its perceived legitimacy. It could also result in inter-agency
warfare. Thus, the FDA could engage concerns about race and BiDil with
agencies like the Office of Civil Rights in HHS for example. It could also have
conceivably intervened on BiDil related advertising to ensure that it is racially
sensitive and did not exacerbate stigma. But a straight ban on BiDil purely
because of concerns regarding race would have been an extreme step.
Legitimacy arguments, in turn, connect to concerns over legality, both
constitutional and statutory. These arguments are more complex. First,
constitutional law suggests some degree of calibration is necessary. Even if

278. Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism About Responsive Tax Administration, 66 TAX L. REV. 121,
128 (2012).
279. Chief Judge Mikva, without rejecting the approach in principle, hinted at a similar
observation in Competitive Enterprises: “The majority’s predictions about effects on the behavior
of both manufacturers and consumers and the likely safety consequences of these anticipated
effects . . . represent musings that the agency considered and reasonably rejected.” Competitive
Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 956 F.2d 321, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Mikva,
C.J., dissenting in part); see also Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 117, at 1777.
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constitutional law does not require calibration in this context, constitutional
doctrine in analogous contexts suggests that calibration here is the preferred,
more legitimate, approach.
In constitutional cases, the concept of calibration is best captured by the
“proportionality” principle. As Vicki Jackson recently explains, according to
the principle “larger harms imposed by government should be justified by
more weighty reasons and that more severe transgressions of the law be more
harshly sanctioned than less severe ones.”280 Jackson offers a full defense of
the principle in American constitutional law, both as a civil and criminal
matter, but a sketch here is appropriate.
In many constitutional contexts, courts have intuitively, albeit not in any
systematic way, considered the importance of the state’s goal, the extent of
the burden, and ‘fit.’ For example, when certain important—fundamental
—rights are infringed, the Court demands strict scrutiny, justified by a
compelling state purpose and a narrowly tailored fit. When other, less
important rights are infringed, the calibration is taken down a notch, with a
relaxed purpose/fit requirement.
The Court’s calibration appears to consider, not just the nature of the
right, but the nature of the burden, which in turn appears to track intuitions
constituent with the regulatory pyramid. Consider Alan Brownstein’s wellknown article defending the development of the undue burden standard in
reproductive rights cases. In that context, he argues, the Court looks, not just
to the importance of the right, but to the severity of the burden the state
imposes. An incidental burden of even important rights receives only rational
basis scrutiny. But more substantial—or undue—burdens of those rights
receive strict scrutiny.281 Thus, as in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a disclosure
requirement by doctors triggered very deferential constitutional scrutiny
—such disclosure requirements, as a regulatory matter appear quite
attenuated.282 But more severe burdens on the abortion right, such as outright
bans, receive more searching scrutiny. But as the government’s interest in
fetal life increases as the fetus becomes more viable, the more rigorous the
burden it can impose on abortion.
Notably, the Court’s approach, and Brownstein’s analysis, does not
appear to depend on any analysis that is particular to the abortion context.
The Court’s analysis in this context, if not textually unmoored, seem to be
based as much on common sense as upon exegesis of precedent and doctrine.

280. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094,
3098 (2015).
281. See generally Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis
in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1994) (providing analysis on the undue burden
standard for government regulation).
282. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that
the undue burden test rather than a trimester-based approach should be used in the evaluation
of restrictions on abortion).

A4_KONNOTH (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/11/2019 4:46 PM

DRUGS’ OTHER SIDE-EFFECTS

229

The intuition appears simple—the more extreme the government’s action
—or to use the administrative argot above, the higher up on the regulatory
pyramid it is, the surer and more compelling must be its goals and the fit
required.
This intuition appears to have seeped into the administrative context in
some form at least. Consider the Fifth Circuit’s gloss on the Toxic Substances
Control Act, in which it observed that the Act “provides the EPA with a list of
alternative actions, but also provides those alternatives in order of how
burdensome they are.”283 Much like the FDCA, “[t]he regulations thus
provide for EPA regulation ranging from labeling the least toxic chemicals to
limiting the total amount of chemicals an industry may use. Total bans head
the list as the most burdensome regulatory option.”284 In that case, the court
found the EPA’s challenged action—a total ban on asbestos use—to be
problematic because of how drastic it was, an approach “the petitioners
characterize[d] as the ‘death penalty alternative.’”285 The court held that the
EPA was required to use the “least burdensome means” to achieve a particular
result.286 It noted, that administrative action lower down the list, such as
labeling, might well have achieved the same result that banning asbestos
did.287 The overbreadth of the agency action compared to the desired goal
appeared to concern the court.
I do not seek to make the case that the constitutional analysis here is
systematic or pervasive—as Jackson’s analysis shows, it is not. But the intuition
that some proportionality is appropriate does appear regularly in
constitutional doctrine.
The FDA’s actions can affect important interests. Matt Lamkin, indeed,
seeks to argue that FDA interference is constitutionally limited: “[w]here
medical interventions affect bodily integrity or identity in fundamental ways,
the Court has repeatedly recognized that individuals’ decisions about these
interventions can implicate a ‘realm of personal liberty which the government
may not enter.’”288 I believe Lamkin’s claim is an overstatement. Government
intervention affects human behavior and morality in a range of ways.
However, the intervention cannot go beyond certain limits—cannot, for
example, in the reproductive justice cases, present an “undue burden.”289
Calibration helps address these concerns.
Finally, the FDA’s organic statute also appears to recommend calibration
in some rudimentary form, as I describe in the next Section.
283. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215 (5th Cir 1991).
284. Id. at 1215–16.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1223.
287. Id. at 1228.
288. Lamkin, supra note 141, at 565 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
289. See Brownstein, supra note 281, at 878–79.
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C. STATUTORY CALIBRATION
In most of its actions, the FDA can consider safety and public health.
Public health requires the FDA to broadly consider health infrastructure
related issues, such as supply chain or risk mitigation. This almost certainly
brings indirect effects and community or social level harms within its reach.
The statute explicitly directs the FDA to consider the psychological or
cognitive effects of drugs on individuals and refers to the health of
marginalized communities as a public health concern. But while broad, these
terms are, of course, limited in scope. The FDA might, for example, consider
the taste of a drug if it has health ramifications—for example, if there is
evidence that taste affects drug adherence. But it cannot consider the taste of
the drug for purely aesthetic reasons. These limits appear relaxed in the
advertising context, where the FDA may even more broadly consider
“consumer good and well-being.”290
Here I argue that the statute roughly tracks the calibration I lay out
above. The statute appears to roughly calibrate the severity of the intervention
to the criteria I lay out in Part III. Roughly speaking, when it comes to the
most coercive kinds of FDA action—refusal to approve a drug—the FDA can
only consider health related issues. While these include public health, safety,
and the like, they are more likely to involve first person, direct, physiological
harms. And when it comes to withdrawal, which is even more severe than
denial, the harm must be “substantial and imminent.” But when providing
non-coercive recommendations about advertising, for example, the FDA is
able to consider overall consumer “good and well-being.”
I note that I pick these decisionmaking steps as key FDA functions
without purporting that they represent an exhaustive list of FDA actions.
Other tools in the FDA arsenal, for example, include advisory guidance,291 or
even conditional approval on the adoption of certain REMS, that might
require drugs to be distributed by physicians with special training in certain
facilities.292 Although the regulations have rendered the statutory language
more specific, as written, the law allows for some leeway.

290. Though given recent First Amendment jurisprudence, more such limits might exist. See,
e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 579–80 (2011) (holding that certain state regulation
pertaining to drug detailing violated speech rights). I cannot discuss this jurisprudence in detail,
confining my comments here to the organic statute.
291. The Food and Drug Administration’s Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance
Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 8,961, 8,967 (1997).
292. It is questionable whether the FDA had this authority until 2007. See Wash. Legal Found.
v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 34–36 (D.D.C. 1995); Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the
Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 876–82, 886–93,
922–23. However, 2007 statutory amendments have confirmed this authority. See Evans, supra
note 33, at 440; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2018).
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1. Approval
According to the statute, in applicable part, the Secretary may only refuse
to approve a drug if:
[She] finds . . . that . . . the investigations . . . [into the drug] do not
include adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show
whether or not such drug is safe for use under the conditions
. . . suggested in the proposed labeling thereof; [or] the results of
such tests show that such drug is unsafe for use under such
conditions . . . [or she] has insufficient information to determine
whether such drug is safe for use under such conditions.293
The statute does not clearly define the term “safe.” Merriam Webster tells us
that safe means “free from harm or risk.”294 One could imagine using the
drugs described in the previous Part in accordance with the “conditions
. . . suggested in the proposed labeling thereof,” and still seeing many of the
side-effects I describe. These effects constitute “harms or risks” in common
parlance. Thus, while the subject the FDA is asked to consider is the drug’s
“safety,” the word, by itself, devoid of further context could implicate a range
of effects.
Another clue as to the factors that might go into safety determinations,
however, can be gleaned from other provisions of the statute that detail other
aspects of the approval process. Consider the provisions concerning risk
mitigation strategy. At the time of the application, “[i]f the Secretary
. . . determines that a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy is necessary to
ensure that the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks of the drug,” approval
could be conditioned on the submission of such a strategy.295 The risk
mitigation strategy might require medication guides, patient package inserts,
or communication plans to the relevant providers. One might fairly conclude
that the REMS determination, being part of the approval process, is meant to
promote the overall goal of approval, that is, “safety.”
In making a REMS determination, “the Secretary shall consider
. . . factors” including “[t]he estimated size of the population likely to use the
drug[,] . . . [t]he seriousness of the disease or condition that is to be treated
with the drug[,] the expected benefit of the drug with respect to such disease
or condition,” and “[t]he seriousness of any known or potential adverse
events.”296
Notably, the considerations here all seem health-related: Benefits must
relate to the seriousness of the disease or condition, and elimination of that

293. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).
294. Safe, MERRIAM-W EBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/safe?utm_
campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld [https://perma.cc/V76T-9Y9J].
295. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1).
296. Id.
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disease or condition—a health related effect. (Note that the effect could be
indirect, such that risk compensation might be taken into account. A drug
that increased HIV prevalence due to risk compensation would fail to produce
benefits). Similarly, adverse events relate to health. As the statute describes
elsewhere, adverse events are “health-related event associated with the use of
a . . . drug that is adverse.”297 Given that REMS turn on health related
considerations, we might conclude that the overall “safety” concerns the
statute is concerned with are also health related.
Another reason for that conclusion can be gleaned from another aspect
of the approval process—the setting of approval fees. Apart from the actual
approval of the application, another important aspect of the drug approval
process is the setting of approval fees. The statute allows the Secretary to
“grant a waiver or reduction of a fee” in the interest of public health.298 Again,
public health is not clearly defined in the statute, although the Secretary must
take action to protect the public health in many other contexts that I do not
discuss.299
The term public health, however, is quite broad. Turning again to
Merriam Webster, the term refers to “the art and science dealing with the
protection and improvement of community health by organized community
effort and including preventive medicine and sanitary and social science.”300
“Community health,” “preventive medicine,” “social science,” are all terms
susceptible to broad interpretation. Similarly, in Whitman v. American Trucking,
as described above, Justice Breyer endorsed a broad approach, opining that
reducing income by regulation posed a “public health” risk.301 Nonetheless,
the underlying goal appears clear—improving the health of the community
and the public.
Thus, read in context with other approval-related provisions in the same
subchapter, the broad “safety” criterion that governs drug approval appears
to encompass only health related considerations. On one hand, health is a
broad concept in many ways. However, on the flip side, the Secretary cannot
very plausibly consider non-health related criteria.

297. Id. § 379aa. Although this section does not concern drug approval, there is no indication
that Congress sought to vary the meaning of the term.
298. Id. §§ 379h(d), 379j.
299. Id. § 360ii(a) (“The Secretary shall establish and carry out an electronic product
radiation control program designed to protect the public health and safety from electronic
product radiation.”); id. § 360bbb-3(b)(1)(C) (“[A] determination by the Secretary of a public
health emergency . . . or has a significant potential to affect, national security, and that involves
a specified biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent or agents, or a specified disease or
condition that may be attributable to such agent or agents.”).
300. Public Health, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
public%20health [https://perma.cc/MC66-HZCY].
301. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 495 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
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2. Advertising/Labeling Review
Although recent Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence might
raise doubts about the full extent of FDA power in this area,302 in the statute
as it is written at least, the FDA has the power to penalize “false or misleading”
advertising.303 It may also require information regarding “side effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness” to be included in advertising or labeling.
It is fair to assume that such information concerns narrower side-effects such
as physiological or chemical reactions rather than broader side-effects. 304
In addition to this, the FDA has the authority to prereview television
advertisements in certain narrow circumstances. “In conducting a review of a
television advertisement under this section, the Secretary may make
recommendations with respect to information included in the label of the
drug . . . on changes that are . . . necessary to protect the consumer good and
well-being.”305 A more recent statute required the FDA to consider “whether
the addition of quantitative summaries . . . to . . . promotional labeling or
print advertising . . . would improve health care decisionmaking by clinicians
and patients and consumers.”306 Here, broad terms like “good and wellbeing,” or “health care decisionmaking” are key to deciding whether the
advertisements are suitable.
This section also shows special solicitude for the needs of marginalized
groups. The Secretary may also make recommendations “on statements for
inclusion in the advertisement to address the specific efficacy of the drug as it
relates to specific population groups, including elderly populations, children,
and racial and ethnic minorities.”307
Although the term “efficacy” is plausibly read narrowly as the chemical
effects of the drug on the individual’s body, the mandate to consider overall
“good and well-being” is a broad one. The statute repeats once more that “the
Secretary shall take into consideration the impact of the advertised drug on
elderly populations, children, and racially and ethnically diverse
communities.”308 The term “impact” is broader than “efficacy,” and in context
should be read in tandem with “good and well-being.”
Additional legislation provides insight into the way in which the
discretion might be exercised. In so doing, the FDA must “review all available
scientific evidence and research on decisionmaking and social and cognitive
psychology and consult with drug manufacturers, clinicians, patients and

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
21 U.S.C. § 333(g).
See generally Konnoth, supra note 135 (discussing the narrower side-effects).
21 U.S.C. § 353c (providing for prereview of television advertisements).
Id. § 352 note.
Id. § 353c(b)(2).
Id. § 353c(d).
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consumers, experts in health literacy, representatives of racial and ethnic
minorities, and experts in women’s and pediatric health.”309
This broad mandate therefore requires the FDA to consider the cognitive
and behavioral—that is indirect—behavior of drug recipients. It requires the
FDA to consider criteria such as “good and well-being.” This approach
suggests calibration—those criteria, applied to labeling and advertising, are
notably broader than the “safety” and “public health” considerations to which
the FDA is limited in making approval decisions.
3. Post Approval/Marketing Power
“[T]he Secretary may . . . require a responsible person . . . to conduct a
postapproval study or studies of the drug” to assess known or feared “serious
risk related to the use of the drug.”310 “The term ‘serious risk’ means a risk of
a serious adverse drug experience.”311 In turn, “serious adverse drug
experience” is an adverse drug experience that results in “death or immediate
risk thereof; hospitalization . . . a persistent or significant incapacity or
substantial disruption of the ability to conduct normal life functions;” or a
condition that would require “medical or surgical intervention to prevent”
any of the above events.312 This appears to cabin the FDA’s post-approval
power to physiological reactions.
But the provisions of the statute relating to actual withdrawal broaden
these powers. The FDA’s post-market power allows it to notify the public and,
if necessary, provide for refunds and reimbursement, if a device “presents an
imminent or substantial hazard to the public health.”313 It also allows it to
recall any product if there is a “substantial or imminent risk to the public
health.”314 Thus, at this key point of the post-approval stage, the FDA once
more is given the authority to consider public health related concerns.
However, again, we see calibration: These concerns must be “substantial or
imminent,” even if they are not necessarily physiologically related.
4. Adjusting the Process
Even as the statute exhibits rough calibration, it is clear that the basis of
such calibration was, if anything, intuitive, rather than clearly planned. Given
the roughness of the statute’s boundary lines, an issue that is indirect, and
affects only third parties might fall squarely within the safety or public health
realm. The FDA might have the authority to impose severe penalties but

309. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3507, 124 Stat. 119,
530 (2010).
310. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(A).
311. Id. § 355-1(b)(5).
312. Id. § 355-1(b)(4).
313. Id. § 360h(a)(1).
314. 42 U.S.C. § 262(d)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e).
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should avoid doing so. In such circumstances, the FDA should generally rely
on advertising and labeling tools as well as advisory guidance.
This is precisely the approach the FDA ended up adopting the case of
PrEP for example—one of the few drugs in which it considered these other
side-effects. Commentators urged the FDA to refuse approval of the drug
because of these effects. But the advisory committee decided—not without
some difficulty—to recommend drug approval because of its certain and
immediate benefits were substantial. At the same time, the committee
demanded continuous study, and several members expressed the expectation
that they could return and adjust the conditions of approval depending on
how drug adherence behavior played out in the real world.
Other adjustments, however, should be adopted. Some of these
adjustments are clear from the PrEP approval process. First, the process for
taking into account the effects I outline remains unclear to the participants.
For example, after learning about adherence related problems, members of
the PrEP committee noted to the FDA members that they had “questions
about the questions” which the committee was supposed to answer for the
FDA.315 A clear guide on the kinds of effects the FDA and its committees
should consider, ranging from social to physiological, should be used, along
with an explanation regarding calibration and the considerations involved.
Second, when “other” side-effect information comes up during
committee hearings, committee members should be given the power to
recommend approval conditionally, and propose their own guidelines, as well
as demand a list of follow up studies. In the PrEP context the committee
members could not do any of this and could simply vote up and down.
Members, however, emphasized the need for “implementation studies,
demonstration projects, the postmarketing studies,” as well as compulsory
rather than voluntary registries that would allow them to carry out the studies,
in light of the testimony they had received.316 Yet, they were unable to provide
a list to the FDA of these recommendations.317
Finally, in addition to the physiological side-effects, the FDA should
prepare for each drug a list of other side-effects that it is studying, that others
are studying, and that it recommends study on. This will make the process
clear and transparent.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Some may ask how far my claims cut—today, I might seek to apply this
theory to the FDA, tomorrow, to other agencies. However, two reasons suggest
that my quest for systematizing these effects should be limited to the FDA.
First, unlike many other agencies, the FDA’s default approach is highly

315.
316.
317.

See 1 Truvada Hearings, supra note 58, at 439.
Id. at 312.
See id. at 439.
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formalized and technical. Indeed, as I note above, Roscoff and Revesz point
to the FDA as a model for ancillary effects assessment.318 I simply seek to
incorporate these other side-effects into an already systematized and
formalized framework. Second, other agencies to my knowledge do not
appear to have created a similar distinction as the FDA. As I outline above,
they consider ancillary effects that come to their attention, whereas the FDA
seems to draw a line between those that it considers systematically (direct,
physiological, and first person) and those that it will not.
What are some examples where systematic FDA review of nonphysiological, indirect, third-party harms would be valuable? Consider a few
examples from Part II. The FDA would be well within its authority to make
decisions about PrEP based on risk compensation behavior, since that
behavior clearly has implications for public health and safety. I believe that
PrEP offers benefits that outweigh any risk compensation evidence. But
reasonable minds, including experts in the field, may disagree with me.
Risk compensation behavior is hard to monitor in clinical trials—only the
real world allows proper collection of this information. I therefore suggest
reviewing and addressing this issue post-marketing. The FDA should have
mechanisms in place for continuous review of risk compensation behavior.
This review can be folded into existing post-market surveillance programs that
might integrate individual health and pharmacy records. We will be able to
longitudinally track the incidence of STDs among individuals on PrEP with
relative ease.319
The cost concerns that arise with sofosbuvir are similarly health related.
The costs of the drug have important implications for health programs such
as Medicare and Medicaid, as well as for private insurance. Tentative drug
price information should be available at the time of application. While the
FDA might run into political roadblocks if it refused to approve an application
solely because of projected price, having the information would allow it to
begin discussions with stakeholders about how to limit the public health
effects of drug prices if the drug were approved. And after approval, the FDA
should continue to assess the public health effects of high cost drugs on the
market.

318. See Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 117, at 1791.
319. The Truvada REMS mandates screening only for HIV, not other STDs, every three
months after Truvada is prescribed. GILEAD SCIENCES, INC., CHECKLIST FOR PRESCRIBERS:
INITIATION OF TRUVADA® FOR PRE-EXPOSURE PROPHYLAXIS (PREP) (2012), https://
www.fda.gov/media/86169/download [https://perma.cc/X57R-QYNL]. While anecdotally, I
believe that most providers screen for other STDs as well, the FDA should mandate such
screening. Further, while states report STD incidence to the CDC, they do not include
information about whether the patient is on Truvada. MINNESOTA CONFIDENTIAL SEXUALLY
TRANSMITTED DISEASE CASE REPORT, MINN. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, https://web.archive.org/
web/20180612162946/http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/idepc/dtopics/reportable/forms/std
casereport.pdf. Reporting this information would be key to carrying out risk compensation studies.
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The race related concerns that BiDil presents are harder to parse. On
balance, however, the FDA’s public health mandate explicitly requires it to
consider the welfare of marginalized groups. The FDA should probably limit
its consideration of racial concerns to that of racism in the healthcare context.
Measuring the effects of drugs on social attitudes is hard and is probably best
done after the drug is released. It might be helpful, for example, to attempt
to monitor changes in racial attitudes among doctors who are informed of the
drug. One might also test out different kinds of advertising or labeling to
minimize any harmful attitudes. On the flip side, if the drug were to have
important benefits—curing Tay Sachs disease for example—the FDA might
decide that whatever the race implications, the drug should be marketed
without further intervention.
My hope is that the approach I advocate here will pervade other FDA
decisionmaking. Consider, for example, the FDA’s continued ban on blood
donation by many gay men.320 Although governed by a slightly different
statutory scheme,321 many of my recommendations here could still be taken
into account. The ban, many argue, imposes stigmatic harms on gay
individuals in general, for chimerical health benefits. The FDA does not
appear to take into account such stigmatic harms.
More generally, taking into account non-physiological effects treats our
understanding of health more realistically. When the FDA regulates only
chemical effects, it perpetuates a narrow understanding of health discourse.
This understanding does not conform to medical knowledge regarding the
varied social determinants of health and obscures the culturally contingent
decisions that shape healthcare decisionmaking. Thinking of health more
broadly will help address these problems and take us further forward on the
path to population wellness.

320. The FDA historically banned donation of blood by all gay men. They recently limited
the ban only to those gay men who had engaged in sexual intercourse over the previous year.
Revised Recommendations for Reducing the Risk of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission by Blood
and Blood Products—Questions and Answers, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/
blood-blood-products/revised-recommendations-reducing-risk-human-immunodeficiency-virustransmission-blood-and-blood [https://perma.cc/MP3Q-75KR]. Many have argued that even the
new ban is problematic, given that other high-risk groups can give blood, and the FDA relies in
those cases on blood screening mechanisms. I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, New Blood-Donor
Policy, Same Gay Stigma, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/
opinion/new-blood-donor-policy-same-gay-stigma.html [https://perma.cc/5XTY-Q9KE]; see also
Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, The Afterlife of Homophobia, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 217 (2018).
321. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012) (regulation of biologics).

